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ABSTRACT
The major focus of this paper concerns defining congressional 
issue dimensions towards the American foreign assistance programs of 
1979 to 1982. The resulting dimensions serve as a foundation to iden­
tify coalitions of congressmen who support or oppose different aspects 
of foreign aid policies. Previous foreign aid vote studies have usually 
divided congressmen into pro and con camps or placed them along 
activist-restrained continuums. This study, however, is based on the 
assumption that foreign aid policy has become too complex for such 
divisions and that its dimensions center more around the types of aid, 
the purposes of aid, and the ideological leanings of the intended recip­
ients .
Roll-call votes were initially sorted into dimensions by a factor 
analysis procedure. These results were used to construct issue dimen­
sion indexes for both houses of Congress for the 95th and 96th 
Congresses. For each data set the results produced two groups o f in­
dexes, one concerning funding questions and the others concerning 
policy questions. The funding dimensions were assumed to encompass 
the compromises that were necessary in order to produce passable 
legislation. These dimensions were considered important because they 
could be used to identify congressmen who support or oppose foreign 
aid on a general level. The policy question dimensions, on the other 
hand, were assumed to show two simplified positions towards foreign 
aid issues. At one end of the policy dimension are those mostly con­
cerned with fostering private enterprise and using force to protect the 
status quo and American interests. Called traditionalists, these mem­
bers consider foreign aid to be useful if it enables the United States
V l l
to make a strong response to the spread of communism. The opposite 
side was labeled the prodevelopment position and consisted of those who 
view the capitalism-versus-communism-socialism world view as over- 
simplistic. They are more likely to favor international cooperation in 
solving the Third World problems that make countries susceptible to 
communism. The major basis for congressional decision-making appears 
to be the ideological inclinations of recipient governments. The tradi­
tional group directs aid to right-w ing governments and the prodevelop­
ment group aims aid at moderate and left-leaning nations.
The coalitions which supported the traditional and pro development 
positions were identified by regression equations which included ideol­
ogy , party, region, median income, and urban-rural variables. The 
major finding was that liberals were always more likely prodevelopment 
and conservatives more likely traditional. The importance of ideology 
tends to add credence to the theory that congressmen view foreign and 
domestic issues from the same set of beliefs. Although party was a 
significant factor only half the time its importance was found to be 
related to the pull of presidential loyalty considerations. Regional, 
urban-rural and constituency income factors were found to be of little 
or no importance in identifying coalitions.
vm
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of congressional research is to increase our understanding 
of the congressional decision-making process. In this task students of 
Congress, no less than congressmen themselves, are faced with the 
arduous job of making conclusions from an enormous amount of complex 
and subjective information. The congressional decision-making process 
includes a great deal of bargaining, conflict resolution and blurring 
o f objectives. This is especially true concerning the issue of foreign 
aid legislation. The results are often "a fragmented 'g rab-bag ' of initia­
tives that are often contradictory in content and intended result."^ 
Remarking on the haphazard way foreign aid has been handled, Con­
gressman Clarence Long, a member of the House Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee, said:
It seems to me that our foreign aid program is like a fire 
company going to a raging fire with a hose whose water leaks 
out of the sides and the joints, and never comes out of the 
front, and if the fire ^ oes  out, it won't be because of a fire 
company or anything.
The purpose of the present study is to attempt to find order in 
the apparent confusion. A major effort will be aimed at defining the
Elliott R. Morss and Victoria A. Morss, U .S . Foreign Aid: An 
Assessment of New and Traditional Development Strategies (Boulder, 
C olo .: Westview Press, 1982), p. 79.
2U .S ., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign 
Assistance and Other Related Agencies: Appropriations for 1976 (Part 
3 ), Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appro­
priations . 94th C on g ., 1st. S ess ., 1975, p. 356.
1
2issue dimensions of congressional thinking on foreign aid questions 
from 1979 to 1982. The resulting issue areas will subsequently serve 
as the basis for identifying coalitions of support and opposition to the 
various aspects of the American foreign aid policies. It is hoped that 
this will more accurately reflect the present decision-making cleavages 
within Congress than would a simple for and against foreign aid analy­
sis .
The importance o f the foreign assistance issue lies in the fact that 
every president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has asked for and received 
such legislation as an integral part of his foreign policy. It has often 
been controversial. The divisions of opinion have repeatedly revolved 
around American values and the role which the country wishes to play 
in world affairs. Most recently, President Ronald Reagan, long a foe 
of foreign aid, has proposed initiatives for Central America that include 
relatively large amounts of military and economic assistance. How 
Congress deals with foreign aid has long term consequences for how 
America continues in its role as a world leader.
Aid to other countries is also an important issue area for study 
because it d iffers in several respects from most other policy areas. For 
example, it has no powerful domestic constituency outside the govern-
3
ment directly benefiting from its programs. Politicians are seldom able 
to win political points with the voters by advocating foreign aid pro-
3
Michael Kent O 'Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid (New 
York: Atherton Press, 1967), p p . 57-59. For a discussion of the more 
recent development of foreign government lobbies see Thomas M. Franck 
and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp. 171-6.
3grams. How congressmen view an issue removed from most Americans' 
interest and one that is mostly lobbied for by administration officials 
may shed some light on how strong party, constituency, and personal 
characteristics remain as determinants of policy positions. Within this 
context, this study may add to the information about direct and in­
direct influences on the decision-making p rocess .
Theoretical Basis
Regardless of the issue area chosen for study, a congressional
researcher first needs to analyze how congressmen make decisions.
Most studies answer this by proposing theories based upon methods
congressmen use to simplify information to a level where decisions can 
5
be made. For example, Matthews and Stimson have supported the
cue-taking theory which maintains that when a member must vote on an
issue about which he knows very little, he follows trusted colleagues
0
who have more specific information for an independent decision. David 
B. Truman has analyzed how a legislator's multiple and overlapping
7
group affiliations condition legislative decision-m aking. Many studies 
have concentrated on how decisions are influenced by the coalitions or
4See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973), p . 144; and William L. Morrow, "Legisla­
tive Control o f Administrative Discretion: The Case of Congress and 
Foreign A id ," The Journal of Politics 30 (November 1968):985-6.
^See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 3d 
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & C o ., 1979).
0
°Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Nor­
mal Decision-Making in the U .S . House of Representatives (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p . 45.
7David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 
1951), cited by Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two 
Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
4g
blocs which members enter into in order to maximize their strength .
John W. Kingdon constructed a model of the decision-making process in
which the fundamental decision rule was a consensus mode. Under this
theory a legislator votes according to what would produce the least
amount of conflict among all the significant political forces , including his
9own position, as they relate to the matter.
One underlying theme in all the above theories appears to be pol­
icy content. The member of Congress undoubtedly shares opinions with 
the trusted colleagues from whom he takes cues. The groups, blocs 
and coalitions to which a senator or representative belongs are partly 
determined by the beliefs each holds in common. As well, voting within 
a consensus is conditional on how the majority o f political forces view a 
certain subject. It is with such reasoning that Clausen, MacRae and 
others have supported the issue dimension theory of decision-m aking.1  ^
These theorists regard other theories as providing valuable insights 
concerning the decision-rules used by legislators. However, as Clausen 
succinctly states, the assumption of the policy dimension theory is that 
"with rare exception, the decision-rule is chosen after the policy con­
tent has been determ ined.1,11
The present study is based upon the issue dimension theory. 
Basically, this approach asserts that in order to manage the time and 
energy demands of decison-making, legislators view specific policy pro-
g
Aage R. Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 32.
9
Kingdon, pp. 230-41.
1(1Clausen; and Duncan MacRae, J r .,  Dimensions of Congressional 
Voting (B erkeley: University of California Press, 1958).
11 Clausen, p . 13.
5posals within the confines of a limited number of policy content cate­
gories . Decisions on specific proposals can be made according to the
12policy positions the member has chosen for each policy category.
In two important respects the present study differs from previous 
issue dimension studies. First, while Clausen and MacRae intended the 
dimension theory to be used as a general categorization of issues, this 
study has chosen one specific issue area for analysis. This is an e f­
fort to see how specific the issue dimensions may actually be. Second, 
a more or less all-encompassing ideology variable will be employed to 
check the assumption that congressmen do not use such a general deci­
sion-rule.
Support for examining congressional decisions concerning foreign
aid within the context of issue dimensions can be found in a study by
Rudolph R. Rousseau which concluded that one of four "most significant
factors in the Senate's decisions flowed from the substantive and politi-
13cal contents o f the legislation itse lf."  This factor coupled with the 
personal attitudes of the senator were found to be increasing in impor­
tance. Rousseau reasoned that the rising relevance of issues and opin­
ions was due to the declining significance of executive branch leader­
ship and the decreasing impact of the authorizing committee members' 
judgm ents. *
In order to construct variables to represent congressional issue 
dimensions political scientists can use roll-call votes as indicators of
12I b id ., p . 14.
13Rudolph R. Rousseau, "Factors A ffecting Decisions of the United 
States Senate on Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance Legislation, 
1965 to 1974" (Ph .D . dissertation, Tufts University, 1976), p. 505.
14Ib id ., pp. 499-505.
6congressional opinion. Empirical methods are then used to categorize
15votes according to similar voting patterns. In turn, these new classi­
fications can be used as dependent variables in order to determine how 
a host of independent variables affect policy positions.
Historical Context o f Foreign Aid
An understanding of the issues involved in American foreign aid
requires a basic knowledge of how they fit into the context of the
16country 's foreign policy. From a historical perspective the concept 
of foreign aid grew out of Cold War concerns about containing commun­
ism. The Marshall Plan was seen as an investment of funds to rebuild 
war-torn Europe in order to create economic stability and ensure national 
defense. This program was temporary and successful. Europe and 
Japan did recover. During this same period, communism and the Soviet 
threat appeared to require the arming of friendly countries. For this 
task the Mutual Security Agency was created to oversee the military 
aspects o f foreign assistance.
Beginning in the 1950s the focus o f foreign assistance gradually
turned towards the underdeveloped world. The amount of economic aid
17grew in relation to military aid. In 1973 during the height of detente,
15See Duncan MacRae, J r .,  Issues and Parties in Legislative Vot­
ing: Methods of Statistical Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 
p . 13.
16For more in depth background see Franck and Weisband; Lloyd 
D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nos­
trand C o ., 1968); and Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A 
Comparative Analysis (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 
1970).
17For additional review of economic versus military aid see Franck 
and Weisband; Andrew F. Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy 
Framework (Washington, D .C .: Brookings Institution, 1966); and David 
Wall, The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973).
7Congress approved guidelines for a "New Directions" approach to aid. 
This mandated that "a substantial amount" of development aid was to be 
channeled to the poorest segments of Third World countries. It 
clothed foreign aid with a recognition that past policies had failed be­
cause support for strategic right-w ing oligarchies had left the majorities 
in underdeveloped countries further and further behind in achieving 
economic, social and political power. The poor of the developing world 
do not have the resources to contribute much to the economies of their 
countries. By contributing little they get little in return and the v i­
cious cy cle -o f-p overty  continues. It was hoped that by focusing devel­
opment efforts at the rural poor more of the world's population would 
gain the ability to help themselves.
Although there are numerous approaches to implementing develop-
20ment assistance, they need not be discussed here. This type of aid 
is basically considered to be an additional ingredient in an evolutionary 
development process. Aid is usually in the form of grants, loans, or 
anti-poverty programs. The focus of aid projects include agarian re-
18
18For discussions on the "New Directions" approach to aid see 
Steven H. Arnold, e d ., Readings in International Development, 1982 ed. 
(Lexington, Mass.: Ginn Custom Publishing, 1982), p p . 88-144; Morss 
and Morss, pp. 24-31; and Frances Moore Lappe', Joseph Collins, and 
David Kinley, Aid As Obstacle: Twenty Questions about Our Foregin 
Aid and the Hungry (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Develop­
ment Policy, 1981) pp. 54-70.
19Congressional Quarterly In c ., Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
1982 (Washington, D .C .: Congressional Quarterly, In c ., 1982), p . 162 
(hereafter cited as CQA) .
20See Morss and Morss, pp. 31-57; James P. Grant, Growth from 
Below: A People-Oriented Development Strategy, Developlment Paper, 
no. 16 (Washington, D .C .: Overseas Development Council, 1973); and 
Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity Press, 1975), p p . 85-110.
8form, health care, training and technical assistance, education, and con­
trol o f population growth. The general objectives of both military and 
economic aid are to help countries develop sufficient strength to resist 
external aggression and internal subversion. Usually, military aid has 
included grants, loans, and easy credit terms to buy American-made 
weapons systems; training of military and security forces ; and programs 
of the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Generally, the ESF is a program 
designed to help strategic nations ease the economic burden of their 
defense budgets.
The push for a more development oriented foreign aid policy 
reached a peak under President Jimmy Carter's human rights foreign 
policy. However, under President Reagan foreign aid programs have 
been changed so that they will complement major reversals in foreign 
policy. Strong anti-communist, national security stands have led to 
significant increases in military aid spending. The administration's 
fervent belief in the capitalistic system has redirected the focus of 
economic aid away from anti-poverty programs and towards attempts to 
promote development along capitalistic lines.
As opposed to the earlier Marshall Plan, the goals of aid have be­
come more complex, more vague, more difficult to implement, and thus 
more open to criticism. Whether or not the economic aid programs or 
the military aid programs have been successful is an open question. 
Opponents of military aid believe it is too often used by recipient gov ­
ernments to retard the economic changes development aid is supposed 
to achieve. Encouraging poverty-stricken  countries to spend their 
resources on fighter aircraft and other forms of sophisticated equipment 
does not seem to many to be productive for either the United States or
9recipient nations. On the other hand, opponents o f development aid 
find these programs to be misused and inefficient as well an unneces­
sary drain on American resources. In addition, they often believe that 
the goals o f such aid are impossible to achieve. Divisions of opinion on 
these two directions of foreign aid have been so great in Congress that, 
during the four years under study here, Congress was able to pass only 
one appropriations bill.
Because changes in the scope and direction of foreign aid are de­
pendent upon changing world events and the perceptions of American 
interests, strategic concerns have always been important. Before the 
Reagan administration took o ffice , the nations receiving aid were either 
important because of their susceptibility to communism or because of 
strategic locations. In 1978 the top ten countries receiving U .S . econ­
omic assistance were in order Egypt, Israel, Portugal, Indonesia, India,
21Bangladesh, Syria, Jordan, Philippines, and Pakistan. The Middle
East is a top-priority  area of foreign policy and, correspondingly, in
1981 37 percent of all bilateral aid funds were targeted to Israel and 
22Egypt. Since 1980 Central America has come to be considered impor­
tant and debates over foreign aid increasingly center around the policy 
perspectives and appropriations concerning that region.
Another factor besides strategic considerations which is believed to
play a role in foreign policy and foreign aid is legislative-executive 
23conflict. Any study of foreign aid issues must take this into consider- 
21John W. Sewell et al. , The United States and World Development: 
Agenda 1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p . 234.
99 CQA 1980, p. 200.
23See Franck and Weisband; Rousseau; and Malcolm E. Jewell, 
Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy (University of Kentucky Press, 
1962).
10
ation. Traditionally, foreign affairs issues have been within the
President's domain. The major means available for congressional influ-
24ence has been control over appropriations. The magnitude of this
effort can be seen in a study by William L. Morrow, "Legislative Control
o f Administrative Discretion: The Case of Congress and Foreign A id."
Morrow's research found that cuts in foreign aid from 1955 to 1967
"averaged 20 percent whereas in most other programs a 5 percent cut
25is about average."
The reasons for this general congressional attitude revolve around
26the nature of each side's perspective of the issue. The president's 
major desire is for flexibility in order to handle rapidly changing world 
events. This conflicts with the congressional duties of oversight which 
put legislators in the position o f desiring certainty and accountability. 
Because foreign aid is a low priority issue lacking a structured domestic 
clientele, these oversight duties do not conflict with constituency con­
cerns. Therefore, there is a stronger than usual argument for restrict­
ing administrative programs. Specifically, when a member of Congress
is confronted with losing funds for a project in his district it is difficult
27for  him to justify a vote for increasing aid to fa r -o ff people.
Cuts in administration funding requests and restrictions on presi­
dential discretion often revolve around the effectiveness and efficiency
24Charles M. Tidmarch and Charles M. Sabatt, "Presidential Leader­
ship Change and Foreign Policy Roll-Call Voting in the U .S . Senate," 
Western Political Quarterly 25 (December 1972) :613.
25Morrow, p. 987.
26Ib id . , pp. 985-6, p p . 1004-7.
97 CQAJL979, p. 261; CQA 1981, p p . 178-9.
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of the program s. In this light both liberals and conservatives have
28supported Congress over the executive. However, the question which 
remains is what kinds of programs are congressmen willing to fund or 
not and which ones are they going to restrict and for what reasons.
The following literature review will concentrate on the issues behind 
cuts and restrictions in order to uncover the underlying policy d iffer­
ences senators and representatives have towards foreign aid.
Previous Studies: Issue Divisons
In an analysis based on interviews and an ideology index, Jerrold
E . Schneider hypothesized that members of Congress viewed foreign aid
29within the context of liberal or conservative foreign policy dimensions. 
According to Schneider, ideological divisions on military aid versus 
economic aid are not clear if the types of aid are viewed separately. 
These issues are interwoven into each camp's philosophies of economic 
and world affairs. Furthermore, according to Schneider, congressmen 
view foreign policy issues within the same ideological dimensions as they 
view domestic issues.
B riefly , conservative attitudes are seen to center around the Cold
War beliefs about a growing communist threat to American security and 
30pluralistic values. The Soviet Union is seen to be actively pursuing a 
policy of subversion in the Third World. Therefore, it is unfortunately 
necessary to support authoritarian right-w ing governments, especially 
with military aid, because they are the only dependable anti-communist
28See O 'Leary, p. 86; and Morrow pp. 1000-2.
29Jerrold E. Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress (West- 
port, C onn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).
30Ib id ., pp. 63-66, pp. 73-75.
12
forces . The ensuing anti-communist stability is necessary to encourage
outside private investment. This can spur economic development which
in turn will hopefully lead to social and political development as well.
Under the "trickle down" economic theory direct humanitarian aid will
usually do little to solve the systemic problems of Third World nations.
Besides, the United States can hardly afford a great deal of such aid.
In addition, conservatives take a more revengeful attitude towards
Third World countries' efforts to nationalize American business interests.
They are more likely to demand full compensation.
On the other hand, the liberal perspective is seen to encompass a 
31multipolar world view. Nationalism, especially economic nationalism, 
plays a more significant role in international relations than does commu­
nism, ideology or subversion. Therefore, not only does providing 
large amounts o f military aid seem unnecessary but it also diverts 
resources needed to tackle other problems. In this light, liberals see 
the changing international situation as requiring an American foreign 
policy which would be based on new knowledge and would entail a new 
agenda. The items on the new agenda include the challenges of scar­
city , "the international spread of weapons, technology, population
32upheaval, transnational corporations, communications, and terrorism ."
According to Schneider, the greatest division between the two
ideologies concerns liberal opposition to American intervention to bolster
33"repressive and exploitative right-w ing regim es." Liberals assert that 
American support for right-w ing dictatorships leads to inequality of
31Ib id . , pp. 63-66, p p . 75-80.
Schneider, p . 76.
33Ib id .,  p . 78.
13
political and economic power. This translates into large scale human 
su ffering, not the development envisioned by conservatives. It is these 
conditions which make countries susceptible to communist takeovers.
Liberals appear to be calling for international cooperation and re­
distribution efforts aimed at helping to diminish world problems. This 
would not entail an increase in foreign aid funds as much as it would 
mean taking funds now going to arm right-w ing governments and re­
directing these funds as capital contributions to countries with "respon- 
34sible policies."  With varying degrees of support the liberal position 
towards Third World development includes more favorable terms of trade, 
technology transfers, access to United States markets, humanitarian aid, 
and other forms of international cooperation. This would supposedly 
produce much greater long-term and far reaching benefits for both the 
United States and recipient nations.
Divisions of congressional opinion on the importance of communism 
in the foreign aid rationale are supported by several studies. In analy­
zing results o f roll call votes, both Truman and Rieselbach reasoned that
for  many congressm en, the threat of communism provided the necessary
35ingredient for a favorable foreign aid vote. Strings attached to fo r ­
eign aid bills often prohibited aid to communist nations or required align­
ment with the "free world" and support for the American position at the
q a
Ib id ., p. 201.
35David B. Truman, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign A id ," Pro­
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 (January 1962): 70; 
and Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote 
on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," American Political Science Review 58 (Sep ­
tember 1964):585.
14
36United Nations. At least during the 1970's, however, there was a 
growing number of congressmen who wanted United States foreign policy 
to move beyond the simplistic communism-versus-capitalism world view.
They offered  restrictions to limit United States covert activity in Angola
37and Nicaragua. They have also required the administration to certify
that right-w ing governments are making progress on human rights in
38order to receive aid funds.
The related issue concerning bilateral aid versus multilateral aid
has been touted as indicating a difference between national security
39proponents and development assistance proponents. Channeling aid
through international agencies is viewed by some as a means to depoli-
ticize aid. Not surprisingly, it is attacked because the United States
can not stop such aid from going to communist countries. However, the
results of Rousseau's study seem to provide evidence that there is no
40bilateral-miltilateral aid dimension. It appears that economic views and 
partisan politics blur any anti-communism versus development cleavage 
surrounding this issue.
Other analyses, approaching the study of aid from different pers­
pectives, have uncovered different as well as similar issue areas.
Michael K. O'Leary categorized amendments to foreign aid bills from 1959
41to 1962 into five types. These were (1 ) economic aid, (2 ) military
n/>
Westwood, p p . 33-34.
37Franck and Weisband, pp. 49-50, pp. 117-8.
38Ib id . , pp. 84-93.
39See Arnold, p p . 69-87, p p . 90-91; and Wall, pp. 66-73.
40Rousseau, p . 262.
^ O 'L eary , p p . 82-87.
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aid, (3 ) increasing congressional control over the program, 4) assisting 
the United States economy and (5 ) influencing or controlling the behav­
ior and policies of other nations. O'Leary found that the Senate was 
more inclined than the House to pass amendments to the military aid 
programs and to use foreign aid as a means to help the private sectors 
o f the American economy. The proposals most often approved by the 
full memberships of both houses were those designed to control the 
activities of recipient countries. This type of restriction would of 
course relate to the Cold War concerns and capitalistic economic philoso­
phies already discussed.
O'Leary's fourth category concerning attempts to use aid to benefit
42the domestic economy was mentioned in several other studies. Most 
often alluded to was that the loan, grant, and project restrictions legis­
lated by Congress have insured that close to 90 percent of all aid funds
43are actually spent in the United States. Additionally, more than half
44o f these funds go to large multinational corporations. An example of
such restrictions is the law that requires aid shipments be carried in
American ships and purchases be made in the United States. Less easily
explained is that for each dollar the United States contributes to the
World Bank and the regional development banks about two are spent in
45the United States economy. Although for some senators and represen-
42Jewell, p . 175; and Morrow, p . 1006. For early effects on the 
American economy see Roy Blough, "The Bearing of Foreign Aid on Our 
Domestic Economy,"  Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 
(January 1962): 73-85.
43Black, p . 126; and Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in 
the Third World, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1981), p . 416.
44Lappe', p. 90.
^ L a p p e ', p. 90.
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tatives this may be a rationale to vote for aid, no analyst reasoned that
this constituted a major dimension concerning congressional thinking.
A 1982 study by Morss and Morss described six categories of
46congressional thinking on foreign aid. While it lacks the empirical 
basis of other analyses, it is helpful because it gives a general over­
view of congressional behavior. The classifications already discussed
are the following: (1 ) congressmen concerned with a humanitarian or
47moral responsibility; (2 ) a combination of those who want to promote 
national economic, political, or security interests; (3 ) members who ad­
vocate new ideas such as the Peace Corps or multilateral agencies; and 
(4 ) the opponents who range from Schneider's description o f conserva­
tives to those few who see aid as encouraging the adoption of inappro­
priate Western development m odels.
In the fifth Morss and Morss category are numerous single strategy 
advocates who view "particular development strategies and activities as 
the solution to p overty ."  These methods include appropriate technology, 
population control, integrated rural development or more funds for such 
items as oil and gas explorations. The sixth group comprises those who
are "fen ce -s itters ."  These "care very little about foreign aid, in as
48much as it is a relatively small budgetary item ." They often vote a 
party line.
While no previous study has specifically analyzed foreign aid
46Morss and Morss, pp. 79-83.
47For background on the conflict between strategic and humani­
tarian goals o f foreign aid see Lucian Pye, "The Political Impulses and 
Fantasies Behind Foreign A id ," Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science 27 (January 1962):8-27.
48Morss and Morss, p. 81.
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roll-call votes in order to define issue dimensions, several empirical
works concerning general policy dimensions have produced some insight
about how Congress views foreign aid. For the period 1949 to 1950
MacRae used Guttman scaling to construct general issue dimensions,
one of which concerned only foreign aid legislation. He found that
military aid to Europe (NATO) was seen differently than economic aid 
49(ECA). MacRae's analysis of 1955 to 1956 found that the military-
economic aid distinction remained for Republicans but not for Demo- 
50crats. In addition, unlike Schneider and O 'Leary, MacRae concluded
that foreign aid appeared to be a dimension which congressmen viewed
51as distinct from their domestic policy opinions.
Also seeking general policy dimensions via Guttman scaling proce­
dures, Clausen found foreign aid to be an important policy concept
52within his international involvement dimension. Within this dimension 
aid questions were shown to be distinct from foreign trade, immigration 
and defense matters. In addition, from 1953 to 1964 and 1969 to 1970, 
the foreign aid concept appeared to be one of the most general and in­
cluded, contrary to MacRae's findings, both economic and military aid. 
This dimension was less general in the Senate than in the House. 
Clausen reasoned that this was due to the greater "opportunities
48Morss and Morss, p . 81.
49MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional V oting, p . 237.
50Duncan MacRae, J r .,  "A Method for Identifying Issues and Fac­
tions from Legislative V otes," American Political Science Review 59 
(December 1965): 917.
51I b id ., pp. 922-3.
52Clausen p p . 41-44.
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senators have for considering’ the more detailed aspects of international
53policy on the flo o r ."  In the House these dimensions are usually con­
fined to committees and informal exchanges. Finally, the structure of 
this dimension led Clausen to suggest that the old internationalist-isola­
tionist bipolarization had given way to more of an activist-restrained 
continuum implying that most members have accepted some international 
involvement.
There have been numerous roll-call studies of more narrowly de­
fined issue dimensions. The following two analysts employed factor 
analysis techniques to examine Senate foreign policy issue areas. First,
Barry Bozeman and Thomas E. James found seven factors involved in
54foreign policy voting from 1965 to 1968. The only factor which was 
clearly identifiable as a specific issue area concerned military aid 
versus economic aid. The importance of this cleavage is, however, lim­
ited because it explained less than 3 percent o f the total variance.
Second, Stephen J. Chimbala studied the foreign policy votes of
1961 to 1962 and, out of thirteen factors, he chose the three major ones
55for substantive interpretations. The first dimension represented a 
broad range o f attempts to reduce aid funds and restrict executive 
powers of discretion with overseas agency funding. The second dimen­
sion appeared to show a division of opinion on the funding increases 
included in final versions of foreign aid bills. The third factor was
53Clausen, p . 42.
54Barry Bozeman and Thomas E. James, "Toward a Comprehensive 
Model of Foreign Policy Voting in the Senate," Western Political Quarter- 
ly  28 (September 1975) : 477-95.
55Stephen J. Chimbala, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: A Roll 
Call Analysis," American Political Science Review 63 (March 1969): 148- 
56.
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similar to the first except that the latter more specifically revolved
around foreign aid questions. These results highlight the issue of
spending over other issues. Unlike MacRae, Chimbala suggests that
because Senators divided along spending questions, they probably view
56foreign aid much like they do domestic economic issues.
The empirical studies seem to give some credence to oversight 
duties being of paramount concern. Factor analysis and Guttman scal­
ing have, at least, not been able to show that there are differences in 
voting patterns concerning other underlying issue areas. However, 
other studies taking different tacts have identified a variety of dimen­
sions . Most relevant to the current analysis are anti-communism, na­
tional security, military aid, economic aid, ideological perspectives of 
congressm en, and the recipient country's type of government. The 
next question to be answered pertains to the effects o f certain personal 
and constituency characteristics on congressional foreign aid issue 
divisions.
Previous Studies: Independent Variables
Although previous vote studies have centered around more general 
dimensions, their conclusions o ffer a great deal o f information about the 
effects of party , ideology, and demographic characteristics on congres­
sional voting patterns. Analysts' interpretations and historical contexts 
will be applied in order to provide a theoretical foundation for a more 
narrow ly-defined analysis.
The variable which appears to have had the greatest effect on 
foreign aid voting behavior is region. In fact, both Clausen and Truman
Also see O'Leary, p . 123.56
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cite it as one of the best long-term indicators o f opinion. Most re­
searchers, however, have found the effect of region increases when it 
is used in relation with other variables. Studying part or all of the 
years 1939 to 1962 Jewell, Rieselbach, and Shannon all found sectional
differences were greater within each political party than they were 
58generally .' B riefly, previous studies most often found that opposition
to foreign aid came from the Southern and Mountain regions of both
parties and from Midwest Republicans. A more activist position was
taken by Northern Democrats and Coastal Republicans.
Most of the attention to regional differences has focused on the
South. While Southern Republicans have always been opposed to foreign
aid, Southern Democrats did not begin to disagree with their party 's
favorable attitude until the 1950s. Jewell reasoned that this shift came
from fiscal conservatism as well as from a desire to protect southern
cotton, tobacco and recent industrialization from Third World competi- 
59tion. This group 's divisions over military aid and economic aid have 
not been conclusive. Evidence, however, that the above conclusions 
about party and region are tenuous can be found in Demack's finding 
that during the mid-1970s neither factor contributed consistently to 
foreign aid opinions . ^
57Clausen, p. 171; and Truman, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign 
A id ,"  p . 67.
58Jewell, pp. 49-52; Rieselbach, pp. 581-3; and W. Wayne Shannon, 
Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative 
Behavior in the United States House of Represenatives (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p . 90-92.
59Jewell, pp. 24-26. Also see Rieselbach, p p . 578-9.
60Gary C. Demack, "Demographic Determinants of Senators' Roll- 
call Voting Positions on Foreign Aid Legislation: 1947-1974" (Masters' 
thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1976), p. 65.
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While it is difficult and oversimplifying' to label outright party posi­
tions, it appears that Republicans have usually been more concerned
0 2
with restrictions and Democrats more supportive of technical assistance.
Party, at least until 1964, was considered to be the most significant
single factor. However, even then Schneier found ideological differences
62replacing party in importance. Rieselbach also concluded that party 
had ceased to be important, but he saw urban and ethnic characteristics
02
rising in importance. In addition, Clausen labeled party a weak pre-
64dictor of foreign policy positions.
One o f the most often studied relationships between variables has
been the effect a presidential change can make in party support.
O'Leary and Jewell found that many members of each party became more
65activist when their party controlled the White House. There is evi­
dence that, at least until 1964, party differences were greater under
00
Democratic administrations. This stems from the finding that Repub­
licans were generally more isolationist while Democrats were more inter­
nationalist. A Republican president usually meant that many Republicans 
could be persuaded to support their party 's president and vote for aid 
programs they might normally have opposed. Fewer Democrats would see
^ O 'L eary , p . 59.
62Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on C ongress, 
rev . ed. Edward V. Schneier, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity Press, 1970), pp . 239-244.
^R ieselbach , p. 587.
64Clausen, p. 168.
^ O 'L eary , pp. 60-69; and Jewell, pp. 14-17, pp. 35-43, p. 52.
00
Turner, pp. 62-68. This was reconfirmed by Clausen in 1973.
See pp. 179, 199-206.
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the need to change their internationalist stance and thus a Republican 
president would have bipartisan approval of an internationalist policy. 
Under a Democratic president most Republicans would return to their 
previous positions and the party divisions would become more pronoun­
ced.
Tidmarch and Sabatt, however, found party members were not all 
that susceptable to changes in the party of the President. During the 
1960s an average of 70 percent of the senators did not change their 
foreign aid judgments with a change in party control of the White
07
House. These authors associated most of the changes to years when 
foreign policy issues were consciously promoted as partisan.
Another standard belief is that urban areas have been more sup­
portive of the activist position than rural areas. There is , however, 
disagreement among researchers concerning urban-rural cleavages within
parties and regions. MacRae found it a factor within regions and for
68the Republicans, but not for the Democrats. Turner and Scheier, on
the other hand, concluded that Democrats split along these lines more 
69than Republicans. They reasoned that Democratic rural seats come
70most often from the rural South. This division of opinion was partly 
attributable to rural congressmen being more cohesively concerned 
with communism than their urban colleagues.
To support his belief that relatively little of the anti-aid sentiment 
was explained by urban and rural characteristics, Truman identified
^Tidm arch and Sabatt, pp. 618-20.
68MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional V oting, pp. 276-7.
69Turner, p p . 127-9, 244-5.
70Turner, pp. 165-7.
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pockets of last-ditch urban opposition. The very few Northeasterners
opposed to aid came from urban areas. While the South and Midwest
provided most of the opposition, the strongest negative voting records
came from the highly urban, industrial, Midwest states and from six
Republican districts in Los Angeles. The important qualification in all
this might be that while members from more populous states have been
very supportive of international involvements, those from sparsely popu-
72lated rural states have also been supportive, but less so.
As far as ideology is concerned, Bozeman and James found it to be
the only variable explaining their military aid versus economic aid fac- 
73tor. Conservatives favored military aid while liberals favored the
economic variety. Although MacRae and Turner discovered party to be
distinct from ideology, they believed that differences between support
or opposition to international involvement depends just as much on
74which party controls the presidency.
If attitudes towards Third World versus American nationalism can 
be implied from votes on the Panama Canal Treaties, then ideological 
interpretations have additional credibility. McCormick and Black found 
ideology to be a strong indicator of treaty votes. In this case, liberals 
were defined as those making an effort "to work with other states as 
e q u a ls . . . ,  to reduce international tension, and to move toward peaceful
^Trum an, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign A id ," p . 68.
72See Demack, p . 67.
73Bozeman and James, pp. 491-2.
74Turner, p . 245, 62; and MacRae, Issues and Parties, p . 188.
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change through diplom acy." Conservatives were distinguished by
their desire to maintain the status quo, to defeat challenges to America's
position in the world, and to stop communist expansion.
Of course, the most support for an ideological explanation comes
from Schneider's interviews and vote study. While ideological continuums
76have been suspect for a long time they still are a measure of the de­
gree to which Congress views any specific issue in relation to all others. 
Clausen criticized the liberal-conservative distinctions because they too
often placed liberals as internationalists and conservatives as isolation- 
77ists. According to Schneider, McCormick, and Black, that just might
not be the correct description of the ideological continuum.
The effects of committees on foreign aid policy was found to be an
important factor until the 1950s. Rieselbach suggested the effects of
committee membership had survived controls for party and time at least 
78up to 1958. He reasoned that contact with foreign affairs officials
socialized committee members towards a more informed and supportive
attitude. Demack, however, found no evidence of an effect from 1953 
79to 1974. The decline of committee solidarity fits into the idea that 
foreign aid perspectives have become more ideological.
Rieselbach supplies the most specific combination of variables to
75James M. McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Senate 
Voting on the Panama Canal T reaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 
(February 1983): 49.
76Clausen, pp. 38-39.
^7Ibid, pp. 100-101.
78Rieselbach, p. 580.
79Demack, p . 65.
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explain foreign aid votes. Generally, supporters were found to be 
from coastal, high ethnic, more educated and wealthier districts while 
opposition mainly came from Southern and Mountain regions, low ethnic, 
less educated, poorer and more rural d istricts. He reasoned that ethnic 
support came from the large immigrant groups from Germany and Ireland 
who had begun to view alliance with Britain as less dangerous than the 
communist threat from the Soviet Union. Constituents from higher socio­
economic districts, Rieselbach believed, had more information and more 
concern about foreign policy and thus, they were more willing to ap­
prove involvements. These generalizations, however, pertained to an 
era when most researchers discussed foreign policy cleavages within 
the limited context of support or oppostion .
Summary
The literature review has highlighted the complexity of congression­
al thinking towards foreign aid. The problem of previous research ap­
pears to be that foreign policy and foreign aid questions were usually 
studied from either an internationalist-isolationist dimension or from an 
activist-restrained continuum. The analysis of how independent vari­
ables contribute to Senate and House voting records especially point 
out that there are significant differences o f opinion on aid. This study 
is based on the assumption that most members o f Congress recognize 
the world leadership position of the United States. Therefore, most 
are in favor of some type of world involvement. Hopefully the research 
design, discussed in the next chapter, will facilitate the rediscovery of 
who is for what type of foreign aid.
80
80Rieselbach, p p . 583, 587.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to maintain as much objectivity as possible, this study 
followed a rather involved procedure to define issue dimensions. The 
operationalization of congressional attitudes was divided into the follow­
ing four stages: vote selection; vote categorization; determination of 
valid dimensions; and index construction. The independent variables 
were operationalized by methods used by previous analysts.
The research design was developed to test three hypotheses. The 
first set of expectations pertains to issue dimensions and was based 
mostly on Schneider's descriptions of congressional foreign policy posi­
tions. The other two hypotheses were formulated from a combination of 
variables that have most often been cited as having effects on foreign 
policy voting positions. The hypotheses are stated as follows:
1. Congressional orientations towards foreign aid most likely are 
divided along the lines of two dimensions which will be labeled pro­
development and traditional. The traditional dimension will include 
congressmen more likely to view aid as a means to ensure a stable 
investment climate or to make a strong stand against "communist 
expansionism ." This position will more likely be translated into 
support for right-w ing governments and the type of aid most fa­
vored will usually be military assistance. On the opposite side, 
prodevelopment congressmen will be more likely to view the capital-
ism-versus-communism-socialism world view as oversimplistic and
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will instead tend to see it in the national interest to allocate public 
funds and technology transfers to help solve Third World problems. 
This position will more likely mean favoring aid to moderate or left- 
wing governments and the type of aid supported will usually be 
econom ic.
2. The traditional dimension will more likely be supported by 
conservatives, non-Northeastern Republicans, members from Moun­
tain and Southern states, and members from states or districts with 
lower median incomes.
3. The prodevelopment dimension will more likely be supported by 
liberals, Democrats, Easterners of both parties, members from 
states or districts with higher median incomes, and members from 
urban areas.
Operationalization of Issue Dimensions 
Initial Vote Selection
The initial steps of the research process concerned an involved 
procedure to choose votes which would satisfactorily identify the issue 
dimensions of foreign aid as perceived by the representatives and sena­
tors o f the 95th and 96th Congresses. At first, all House and Senate 
roll-call votes pertaining to foreign aid legislation from 1979 to 1982 
were found in the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs. Votes were not 
chosen if they were on procedural motions and if a clear for or against 
position on the type of aid in question could not be ascertained.^ Votes
^Examples o f votes easily omitted because of an unclear positive 
or negative aid attitude include a vote to require the administration to 
study ways to counter Libyan terrorism; a vote to remove the Peace 
Corps from ACTION; and a vote to approve President Carter's reorgan­
ization of foreign aid. Other votes involved a more subjective decision. 
One example is tabling a motion to remove some specific equipment from
28
were immediately excluded (1 ) if less than 75 percent of the members 
had voted, had been paired, or had announced a position or (2 ) if the 
division of votes was greater than an 80 percent majority opposing a 20 
percent minority. The rationale for eliminating votes approaching un­
animity and for eliminating votes with low rates of participation are that 
such votes are of little value in distinguishing divisions and they lead
to distortion of the product-moment coefficient upon which factor analy-
2sis is constructed. These criteria caused twelve votes to be dropped 
from the House data set and eight votes from the Senate.
Two other modifications were necessary to ensure that repetitious 
votes would not unduly combine to become one dimension by them selves. 
First, for several authorization and appropriation bills there were roll- 
calls on both first passage and on the conference report. For these 
bills, only the final vote of each session was included, thus excluding 
three votes from each data set. Second, other repetitious votes were 
deleted if there was either a series of votes on slightly modified amend­
ments to the same bill or votes on similar amendments to different bills. 
In such cases, every effort was made to choose only those votes which 
indicated a cleavage of opinion and eliminate those which were obviously 
strategy votes. In most instances the vote on the final version of the
the list of munitions requiring approval before being sold to foreign 
con cern s. This motion could either be interpreted as a pro military 
aid proposal or as a decision with unclear positions. In retrospect, 
the author probably erred on the side of omitting these types of v o tes .
2James W. R iddlesperger, Jr. and James D. King, "Energy Votes 
in the U.S.  Senate," The Journal of Politics 44 (November 1982):841; 
and Chimbala, p . 151. For additional discussion of vote selection see 
Bozeman and James, p . 481; Schneider, p p . 111-5; and Lee F. Anderson, 
Meredith W. Watts, J r . ,  and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call 
Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p p . 78-84.
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amendment was chosen and the others excluded. This criterion elimin­
ated eighteen votes from the House data and nine from the Senate.
The selection process described above yielded forty  votes for the 
House and forty-eight for the Senate. At this point it is necessary to
briefly  discuss the limitations o f the data as well as the expectations 
3
for its u se . One limitation is that roll-call votes provide an incomplete 
picture of the decision-making process. They do not capture bargain­
ing in committee, negotiations and voice votes on the floor, or the suc­
cess of the executive and legislative leaders' powers of persuasion. A 
second limitation is that a vote may not be what it appears to be. For 
example, a congressman may vote one way one time and differently an­
other time. This may happen for a variety of reasons including strat­
egy to get a final version of a bill passed or defeated.
The expectations o f the roll-call analyst must be such that the 
above reservations are taken into consideration while selecting votes and 
interpreting the results of the study. The chief advantage of roll-call 
votes is that they are readily available, hard facts, a type of data 
usually difficult for social scientists to obtain. They serve as the best 
record  of the positions taken by senators and representatives. It is 
in analyzing the positions o f congressmen that roll-call votes are used 
in the present study. As final outcomes of the policy-making process
roll-call votes are, as Clausen states, "heavily influenced by the gen-
4eral policy positions of congressm en." By being sensitive to the policy 
content they can provide the basis to infer the influence of other fac-
3
For discussions of the pros and cons of roll call analyses see 
Chimbala, p. 152; MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional V oting, p . 216; 
Turner, p p . 7-13; and Schneider, p p . 91-105.
4Clausen, p. 9.
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tors such as party, ideology and constituency upon the policy-making 
outcom es.
Once the votes were selected, the next step was deciding how to 
handle changes in House and Senate membership within the time periods 
in which Congress voted on foreign aid questions. In the 95th House 
three seats changed hands so that the total number of representatives 
became 437. During the 96th House, four members were replaced. One 
new representative, Katie Hall of Indiana, was not included because she 
had not voted in more than one-half the foreign aid decisions during at 
least one session. Representative William R. Cotter of Connecticut was 
eliminated because before being replaced he had not voted on any fo r ­
eign aid bill. Therefore, the 96th House data consisted of 436 repre- 
senatives. Although one senator in each Congress resigned and was 
replaced, all senators were inlcuded in the vote tabulations. The addi­
tional senator in each Congress raised the total for each Senate to 101.
Vote Categorization
A factor analysis of the roll-call votes was performed in order to 
categorize votes into issue areas. This helped to ensure that the opera­
tionalization of each issue area closely approximated the actual thinking
5
of the representatives and senators. For the factor analysis the votes
5
While factor analysis has usually been used to identify groups and 
the degrees of cohesion or disagreement between these grou p s, some 
have begun to use it to identify issues. For example, see Chimbala; 
Bozeman and James; and Paul Burstein, "A New Method for Measuring 
Legislative Content and Change: Senate Voting on Vietnam War B ills," 
Sociological Methods and Research 6 (February 1978): 340-44.
For an understanding of factor analysis proceedures, the present 
study mostly relied upon Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, pp. 123-74; 
Judith M. Tanur et al. , Statistics: A Guide to Political and Social 
Issues (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1977), p p . 100-113; and Norman 
H. Nie et al. , Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. ,  1975), p p . 468-514.
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were coded with 1 signifying support for the type of aid in question, a 
zero for not voting and a -1 for opposition. This scheme was chosen 
for two reasons. First, the numerical values have some intuitive justi­
fication based on placing missing values between positive and negative 
votes. Absences coded in this way lessened the possibility that 
absences would skew the scores towards either side of the continuum. 
Second, the values assigned are compatible with most computer routines
for factor analysis since the correlation coefficient generated is a Pear-
0
son product-moment statistic.
The inclusion of absences in the computations was necessary be­
cause otherwise the SPSS factor analysis subprogram would have elimi-
7nated all members who failed to vote on any one roll-call. That would 
have left only about one-third of the congressmen for analysis. In 
order to utilize as much data as possible in the computation o f each 
simple coefficient, pairwise deletion of missing data was employed. A 
case was thus included in the computations of all simple correlation 
coefficients for which it had complete data and omitted only when the 
value of either o f the variables being considered was missing.
The factoring method employed was principal factoring with itera­
tions which means that the number of factors extracted was determined 
by the number of factors with an eigenvalue greater than or equal to 
1.0;  the diagonals o f the correlation matrix were initially replaced by 
squared multiple correlations; and the iteration was stopped if the 
convergence reached the .001 criterion. An orthogonal method o f ro-
0
See Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, p p . 149-59; Chimbala, p. 151; 
and Nie et al. , p p . 469-80.
^Nie et al. , p . 504.
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tation was used in which the simplification of the data concentrated on 
the columns, or factors, of the factor matrix.
Determination of Valid Dimensions
The results of the factor analysis were first examined according to 
the heaviest loading variables. The votes and their loadings are given 
in table 1. The cu t-o ff point for inclusion in the tables is a loading 
o f ± .50. Although this figure is arbitrary, it seems to have become
g
conventional. Each factor was surveyed in order to ascertain its con­
ceptual meaning. There are, of course, shades of differences among 
the factors across data se ts , but there are also enough similarities to 
identify comparable factors for each House and Senate. In all four data 
sets one factor focuses exclusively on funding decisions and, naturally, 
these factors were named "fu n d in g ." A second group of factors re­
volved around a variety of legislative efforts to restrict policy, formu­
late policy, or cut expenditures. Since each of these factors is not 
related to any specific issue areas, they will be called "general." Third 
factors were chosen for both chambers of the 95th C ongress. Since 
these additional dimensions appear to be more concerned with the ideo­
logical inclinations of governments receiving American aid, they will be 
labeled "recip ient."
At this point the results of the factor analysis have necessitated a 
change in the terminology to be used throughout the remainder of this 
paper. It was earlier hypothesized that there would be prodevelopment 
and traditional dimensions. However, no such dimensions are attribut­
able to individual factors. Therefore, these concepts will be referred
g
Bozeman and James, p. 482. Chimbala also used .50 as a cu t-o ff
p oin t.
33
LOADINGS FOR THE ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES
TABLE 1
95th House
Factor 1 "General"
Loading Vote Description^
.80 Ban direct and indirect aid to Angola, the Central African 
Empire, Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam, passed. (N) ,  79-400.
.72 Ban International Development Association (IDA) funds to 
Vietnam, passed. (N) ,  79-324.
.71 Reduce funds to the U.N. Development Fund to the fiscal 1979 
level, passed. (N) ,  79-396.
.68 Stipulate that bans on aid to communist countries would not
prevent aid to Egypt, Israel, or any other country not speci­
fically barred, rejected. ( Y ) ,  79-399.
'67 Cut foreign assistance appropriations across-the-board by 4%, 
except aid intended for Egypt and Israel, passed. (N) ,  
79-404.
.66 Delete authorization of arms sales credits to Panama, passed. 
(N) ,  79-60.
.63 Amendment to prohibit economic assistance to Panama, passed. 
(N) ,  79-69.
.62 Delete military aid to Nicaragua from fiscal 1981 foreign aid 
authroization bill, passed. (N) ,  80-238.
.61 Prohibit a $359.5 million U.S.  payment to the Asian Develop­
ment Bank unless Taiwan permitted to continue its member­
ship in the bank, passed. (N) ,  79-325.
.53 Cut authorizations across-the-board by 10% except for Egypt, 
Israel and several specific programs, passed. ( N) ,  80-271.
.53 Prohibit funds to any schools in Nicaragua that housed, em­
ployed, or were made available to Cuban personnel, passed. 
(N) ,  80-75.
.50 Restore House cuts in contributions to development banks, 
passed. (N) ,  80-166.
Following each vote description a (Y ) or an (N ) indicates which 
position was coded as a vote in favor of sending the type of aid in 
question. The numbers at the end of each description concern where 
the tabulation of each vote was found in the CQA. The numbers to 
the left of the hyphen indicate the year and those to the right identify 
the CQA vote number.
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TABLE 1 - -  Continued
Factor 2 "Funding"
.79 Fiscal 1980 foreign aid appropriations bill. First vote, passed. 
( Y ) ,  79-406.
.78 Fiscal 1980 economic and military aid authorization bill. First 
vote, passed. ( Y ) ,  80-272.
.74 Fiscal 1980 economic aid authorization bill. Conference re­
port, passed. ( Y ) ,  79-390.
.66 Cut fiscal 1980 appropriations across-the-board by 5% includ­
ing funding for programs in Egypt and Israel, rejected. (N) ,  
79-402.
.63 Fiscal 1980 military aid authorization bill. Conference report, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  79-510.
.57 Delete appropriation for the Institute for Scientific and Tech­
nological Cooperation, rejected. (N) ,  79-398.
.55 Eliminate appropriation for replenishment funds to the Inter­
national Development Association, rejected. (N) ,  79-323.
.54 Development banks authorization bill. Conference report, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  80-224.
Factor 3 "Recipient"
.74 Authorize ESF aid to Nicaragua and require the President to
report to Congress on Nicaraguan observance of human rights, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  80-269.
.71 Motion to concur in the Senate foreign aid amendment and add 
$80 million in aid to Nicaragua to the fiscal 1980 supplemental 
appropriations bill, passed. ( Y ) ,  80-363.
- .67 Require local currency generated by the U.S.  loan program to 
Nicaragua be used for loans to the private sector through 
Nicaraguan or American private financial institutions, rejected. 
( Y ) ,  80-71.
- .60 Delete sending observers to elections in southern Africa and
delete requiring $20 million in assistance to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
once elections were held in that country, passed. (N) ,  79-73.
.55 $75 million to Nicaragua and $5 million to Honduras in supple­
mental economic aid authorizations, passed. ( Y ) ,  80-77.
.55 Amendment to reduce by $16.7 million the appropriations for
the African Development Fund, rejected. (N) ,  79-332.
.50 Amendment to prohibit any aid to Nicaragua without prior
congressional approval, rejected. ( N) ,  79-405.
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TABLE 1 - -  Continued 
95th Senate
Factor 1 "Funding"
.70 Fiscal 1980 military aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. 
( Y ) ,  70-107.
.70 Fiscal 1980 economic aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. 
( Y ) ,  79-137.
.69 Fiscal 1980 foreign aid appropriations bill. First vote, passed. 
( Y ) ,  79-347.
.62 Contributions to international development banks authorizations 
for fiscal 1980-83, passed. ( Y ) ,  79-101.
.61 Authorize contributions to the International Development Asso­
ciation and the African Development Bank, passed. ( Y ) ,  
80-209.
.60 Reduce military aid authorizations by $56 million, rejected.
(N) ,  79-106.
.56 Fiscal 1981 foreign military and economic aid authorization bill. 
Conference report, passed. ( Y ) ,  80-484.
Factor 2 "General"
.86 Delete prohibition on direct and indirect aid to Angola, the 
Central African Republic, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  79-337.
.78 Delete prohibition on indirect aid to Cuba from language in 
bill prohibiting all aid to Cuba, passed. ( Y ) ,  79-340.
.75 Delete prohibition on the IDA's use of U.S.  contributions to 
aid Vietnam, passed. ( Y ) ,  79-333.
.63 Amendment to appropriate $15.5 million more than the House 
for the Asian Development Bank, passed. ( Y ) ,  79-334.
.57 Delete prohibition on bilateral aid to Mozambique, rejected.
( Y ) ,  79-336.
.50 Amendment to appropriate $826 million for the World Bank 
rather than $163 million approved by the House, passed.
( Y ) ,  79-332.
Factor 3 "Recipient"
.81 Authorize $75 million to Nicaragua and $5 million to Honduras, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  80-148.
.74 Table amendment to delete appropriation for aid to Nicaragua, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  80-272.
.67 Table amendment to allow the president to provide military 
aid to Nicaragua, passed. ( N) ,  80-213.
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TABLE 1 - -  Continued
- .  65 Table amendment to reduce amount o f aid to Nicaragua and 
Honduras and to authorize aid to El Salvador and Guatemala, 
passed. (N) ,  80-16.
.64 Senate bill authorizing aid to Nicaragua and Honduras and 
military aid to certain Caribbean and Central American 
nations, passed. ( Y ) ,  80-17.
96th House
Factor 1 "Funding"
.87 Fiscal 1982 Foreign aid appropriations bill. Conference report, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  81-348.
.83 Fiscal 1982 foreign aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. 
( Y ) ,  81-327.
.55 Amendment to reduce U.S.  contributions to the International 
Development Association to $534.6 million from $540 million, 
passed. (N) ,  81-32.
.52 Appropriate $350 million for the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  82-281.
Factor 2 "General"
.66 Amendment to appropriate funds for Military Assistance Grants. 
(The principle effects of the amendment were to eliminate $20 
million in military aid to El Salvador and halve the amount for 
Somalia.) Passed. ( Y ) ,  82-282.
.66 Prohibit use of funds to improve, construct, or expand any 
airfield in Honduras, rejected. (N) ,  82-255.
.65 Bill to provide duty-free entry into the U.S.  of certain pro­
ducts from most Caribbean nations and to allow tax deductions 
for expenses of conventions held in the Caribbean, passed.
( Y ) ,  82-447.
- .60 Require at least 50% of Agency for International Development 
bilateral assistance funds be used to finance projects benefit­
ing those living in absolute poverty , passed. ( Y ) ,  82-419.
.54 Amendment to put quota on duty-free rum from Caribbean 
nations allowed to enter the U . S . ,  rejected. (N) ,  82-447.
96th Senate
Factor 1 "General"
.86 Table repealing the prohibition on military aid and arms sales 
to Chile, rejected. (N) ,  81-321.
Table reducing by one-half the funding for the CBI, passed. 
( Y ) ,  82-304.
.79
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TABLE 1 - -  Continued
.78 Change human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador into a 
statement o f the sense of Congress that progress should be 
made, rejected. ( Y ) ,  81-275.
.78 Delete approximately $600 million for military and economic aid 
for fiscal 1982, rejected. (N) ,  82-303.
-.7 6  Amendment to add $30 million in Food for Peace aid to Poland, 
rejected. ( Y ) ,  81-465.
.76 Table amendment to bar use of funds for airfield improvement 
projects in Honduras, passed. ( Y ) ,  82-204.
.76 Table amendment which attached conditions concerning elec­
tions in Namibia to repeal of a ban on covert aid to military 
factions in Angola, passed. ( Y ) ,  81-296.
.73 Require aid cu t-o ff to Pakistan and India if either exploded 
a nuclear device in the future, passed. (N) ,  81-314.
.68 Table amendment to bar covert aid to support irregular or
paramilitary forces in Central America, passed. ( Y ) ,  82-441.
.63 Prohibit aid to any nation in which U.S.  property had been
attacked and full compensation had not been made (restriction 
aimed at Pakistan), rejected. (N) ,  81-379.
.62 Reconsider vote which had defeated an amendment to provide 
an ESF contingency fund, passed. ( Y ) ,  81-325.
Factor 2 "Funding"
.82 Fiscal 1982-83 foreign aid authorization bill. Conference re­
port, passed. ( Y ) ,  81-476.
.79 Fiscal 1982 foreign aid appropriations bill. Conference report, 
passed. ( Y ) ,  81-483.
.73 Amendment to budget resolution to eliminate funding for all 
foreign aid programs, rejected. (N) ,  82-128.
.70 Table reducing foreign aid outlays to maintain fiscal 1982 
levels through fiscal 1985, passed. ( Y ) ,  82-147.
.64 Table $700 million limit on International Development Associa­
tion appropriation, rejected. ( Y ) ,  82-449.
.54 Cut foreign aid programs by 4% in fiscal 1982 continuing ap­
propriations bill, passed. (N) ,  81-408.
.53 Authorization bill for the sixth replenishment to the Inter­
national Development Association and for contributions to the 
African Development Bank, passed. ( Y ) ,  81-87.
.51 Amendment to fund foreign aid programs in the fiscal 1983 
continuing appropriations bill, passed. ( Y ) ,  82-418.
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to as positions and this study will attempt to test their applicability to 
the positions found at the ends of the funding, general, and recipient 
dimensions.
Identifying the important factors and making substantive interpre­
tations posed little problem for the 96th Congress. In the House there 
were only two factors, one explaining 56.3 percent of the variance and 
the other 43.3 percent (see table 2 ). The Senate data produced four 
factors, the major two explaining 53.3 and 36.9 percent of the variance. 
In both chambers of the 95th Congress the factor analysis showed divi­
sions of opinion centering around one major issue area. In the House 
the general policy dimension is overwhelmingly the dominant factor.
While the proportion of variation explained by the funding and recipient 
factors was minor, they are included in order to maintain the consist­
ency o f dimensions across data sets and because they revolve around
TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY EACH FACTOR
95th Congress
House Senate
Factor % of Variance Factor % of Variance
*1 86.3 *1 73.2
*2 8.0 * 2 11.0
* 3 5.8 *3 7.5
4 4.5
5 3.8
96th Congress
House Senate
Factor % of Variance Factor % of Variance
*1 56.7 *1 53.3
*2 43.3 * 2 36.9
3 6.1
4 3.7
^Designates factor chosen as major issue area.
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around identifiable issues which recieved a great deal of attention in 
committee and floor debates.
For the 95th Senate the dominant issue is funding. The general 
policy question dimension, explaining only eleven percent o f the vari­
ance, is the weakest general factor. Compared to the range of issues 
included on the other general factors, this one is the most limited. All 
six votes were part of a series of amendments pertaining to the multi­
lateral aid portion of the 1979 appropriations bill. The recipient factor 
in the 95th Senate was also less inclusive than its counterpart in the 
House. A more thorough analysis of the issues involved in all ten fac­
tors is delayed until chapter three.
Index Construction
The final stage in operationalizing the issue dimensions was the
9
construction of indexes from the major factors. Votes for each dimen­
sion index were selected if the vote loaded with a coefficient of .50 or 
greater on the factor. Each vote then became an equal indicator of its 
particular dimension. At this point two changes in the vote coding were 
necessary to standardize the indicators. First, the coding for  votes 
with negative loadings was reversed so that a -1 represented the nega­
tive end of the dimension and a 1 the positive end. Second, the codes 
for the 96th House and Senate general dimensions were switched. The 
policy positions indicated by a 1 on these votes had been similar to 
the positions coded -1 for the general factors in the other Congress. 9
9
The construction and use o f indexes were formulated from Mary 
Grisez Kweit and Robert W. Kweit, Concepts and Methods for Political 
Analysis (Englewood C liffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p p . 167-9; 
and Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, pp. 15-28.
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Reversing the positive and negative signs helped avoid undue confusion 
in interpreting resu lts .
Index scores were computed for each congressman by adding the 
member's vote on each bill and dividing by the total number of roll- 
calls. This produced a continuum of scores ranging from -1 to 1. The 
inclusion of missing values, coded as zero, in the index construction 
moved the index scores towards the middle range. For example, if a 
congressman voted for aid five of six opportunities but did not vote 
the sixth time, then his score would be .83 instead of 1. This skewing 
could easily have been corrected by dividing the raw score by the num­
ber of times the member voted rather than by the number of ro ll-ca lls . 
However, all other vote computations used in this study included miss­
ing values, so it was reasoned that in the interest of consistency the 
index score would not be different. These scores enabled the creation 
of variables representing conceptually understandable cleavages in the 
voting patterns of each house during each congress. These dimensions 
will be used as dependent variables in multiple regression analyses aimed 
at inferring the influences of constituency and personal characteristics 
upon congressional foreign aid positions.
Operationalization of Independent Variables 
The independent variables in the regression are mostly straight­
forward operationalizations.10 The constituency variables include re-
For further discussions concerning independent variable opera­
tionalizations see Clausen, pp. 151-66; Shannon, p p . 117-9; Bozeman 
and James, pp. 481-4; Lewis A. Froman, J r . ,  Congressmen and Their 
Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. ,  1963), p . 91; and John 
E. Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress: Their Effects on 
Senate Voting Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 
pp . 147-59.
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gion, median income and metropolitan population. The personal charac­
teristics are party and ideology. The data on the constituencies are 
1970 United States Census statistics. ^  The value used for metropolitan 
population is the percentage of citizens living within Standard Metro­
politan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).  For most of the states and districts 
a SMSA is defined as a county or group of contiguous counties which
12contains at least one city or "twin cities" of 50,000 or more residents. 
Rural areas are those not defined as metropolitan. The choice of this 
statistic is based on Turner's reasonings. Since the census designation 
of urban areas includes those living in towns or cities as small as 2,500, 
he felt that the SMSAs were a more realistic description of urban-rural 
constituencies.
The regional categories were based on the following classification 
14of states:
Northeast: 
Middle Atlantic:
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware 
East North Central: Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin 
West North Central: Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas
U . S . ,  Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Congres­
sional District Data Book, 93rd Congress (A Statistical Abstract Supple­
m ent), 1973; and Congressional District Data: 94th C ongress, CDD no. 
94-1 T exas, 94-2 California, and 94-3 New Y ork , 1974.
Regretfully, the changes, sometimes drastic, within congressional 
districts and states are not accounted for in this study because the 
1980 census figures had not been compiled as of this study's data 
compilations.
12U . S . ,  Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Congres­
sional District Data Book, 93rd C ongress, p . x i .
^ T u rn er , p. 110.
^C lausen , p. 161
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Mountain: Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, 
Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona 
California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, 
Hawaii
Missouri, Maryland, West Virginia, Oklahoma. 
Kentucky, Tennessee
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas
Pacific:
Border:
South:
The categories used to test the second hypothesis were Mountain and 
South. For the third hypothesis a combination of Northeast and Middle 
Atlantic were used to represent Eastern representatives and senators.
In order for nominal data such as region and party to meet the 
interval level measurement assumption in linear regression analysis, 
nominal data are transformed into dummy variables. This is fairly easy 
when only specific categories are being used. All members from a 
chosen category such as Mountain are coded as 1 and all others as zero. 
The study also uses additional regressions which include all regional 
categories. In this case the coding system is applied to seven of the 
eight regional groups. Dummy coding the eighth region is redundant 
because its members are already identified as not being a member of 
the seven other regions.*"*
Ideology scores are Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings
10for "liberalism" on both domestic and foreign policies. The annual 
scores were averaged in order to have one score representative of the 
congressm en's relative ideological position for each data set. A low 
score indicates a more conservative member while a high score identi­
fies a more liberal one. As far as ideology ratings go, the ADA's re ­
sults are considered to be one of the best and have been used by poli-
15Nie et al. , pp. 347-81. Also discussed by Clausen, p . 191.
16Found in CQA 1979-82.
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. 17tical scientists such as McCormick and Black. Another justification of
this variable is that ADA scores are comparable to those compiled by
other groups and means. For example, according to a path analysis
done by Bullock and Brady, there was a fair amount of similarity be-
18tween the ADA and Conservative Coalition.
Bozeman and James also used a liberal-conservative scale, al­
though they did not say what it was. Schneider developed his own 
ideology measurement.
18Charles S. Bullock III and David W. Brady, "Party, Constituency, 
and Roll Call Voting in the U.S.  Senate," Legislative Studies Quarterly 
8 (February 1983): 29-43. Conservative Coalition scores are computed 
annually by the Congressional Q uarterly.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The basic ingredient of this research is delineating congressional 
opinion on foreign aid into a small number of comprehensible issue 
dimensions. The four data sets produced a total of ten indexes easily 
classified into two groups, funding and policy questions. An in depth 
look at these representations of issue dimensions will hopefully provide 
some insights into, first, what congressional attitudes might be and, 
second, how closely the hypothesized positions are to those existing 
from 1979 to 1982.
Issue Dimensions
Funding
One dimension focusing solely on funding questions appeared in 
each data set. For the most part these four factors were similar in 
com position.1 Each included all the votes to pass the authorization and 
appropriations b ids, most of the votes on multilateral funding, and at 
least one amendment to cut aid spending levels. The positive end of 
each continuum represents approval for funding the types o f aid pro­
grams included in the b ills .
There were few specific differences between the types of votes
■^ See table 3 for synopses of the funding dimension indexes.
For a more complete description of the votes included on each index see 
table 1.
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TABLE 3
SYNOPSES OF FUNDING DIMENSION INDEXES
95th House: Economic and military aid appropriations and autljoriza-
tions--m ore economic aid than military aid (5) .  
Multilateral aid authorizations (2) .
Funds for the Institute for Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation (1) .
A cross-the-board  cut in aid funds (1) .
95th Senate: Economic and military aid authorizations--more economic
aid than military aid (3) .
Multilateral aid authorizations (2) .
Cut in military aid authorizations (1) .
96th House: Economic and military aid appropriations and authoriza-
tions--m ore military aid than economic aid (2) .
Funds for the Caribbean Basin Initiative (1) .
Cuts in multilateral funds (1) .
96th Senate: Cuts in or limits on aid funding levels (4) .
Economic and military aid appropriations and authoriza­
tions—more military aid than economic aid (3) .  
Multilateral aid authorization (1) .
Number in parentheses indicates number of votes on the subjects 
that are included in the index.
included in the House and Senate factors. The two odd votes both con­
cerned special administration program s. The 95th House index included 
a vote on President Carter's proposed Institute for Scientific and Tech­
nical Cooperation. The purpose of the institute was to coordinate re ­
search on development programs. The Senate's vote on this program 
did not load sufficiently high on any factor to be included in an index. 
In the 96th Congress the House factor included a vote on the appropri­
ation for President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) ,  a pack­
age of aid and trade provisions to friendly Caribbean nations. The 
Senate's vote on this issue was included within its policy question
dimension.
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Most of the differences in these indexes were between the two time 
periods. The major area of divergence concerns the different propor­
tions of development aid and military aid included within the funding 
measures of the 95th Congress compared to the 96th Congress. This 
study calculated that the military aid portions of appropriations bills
included in the indexes were 35 percent in 1979, 48 percent in 1981,
2and 55 percent in 1982. These figures are rough estimates. A scer­
taining the actual levels of each type of aid is an extremely complex and 
subjective operation because many of the aid programs are intended to
3accomplish both developmental and military objectives. The general 
idea is that by all accounts military aid increased and developmental aid 
decreased from 1979 to 1982.
Although the differences cited above indicate a relative change, 
they do not dispel the overall general scope of the funding dimensions. 
Evidence that the focus of these four indexes is general can be found
2Economic aid included bilateral and multilateral economic aid. 
Military aid included military assistance, international military education 
and training, appropriated amounts for Foreign Military Sales credits, 
the Economic Support Fund, and the peace-keeping and international 
narcotics control programs.
The 1979 percentage was calculated from that year's House-passed 
appropriations bill. The figures were found in CQA 1981, p. 350. The
1981 percentage is from the final version of the appropriations bill pas­
sed by both houses. The figures were from CQA 1981, p. 350. The
1982 percentage is from the Senate version of the foreign aid amendment 
to the continuing appropriations bill. The amount approved in the final 
version was 52 percent. These percentages were calculated from fig ­
ures in CQA 1982, p. 245.
3
Different people cite different figures for the percentages of de­
velopment and military aid. A Congressional Quarterly study found that 
during the years 1979 to 1981 the balance shifted no more than seven 
percent between any given year. The percentage o f military aid for 
1979 was 46 percent, 1980-- 48 percent, and 1981-- 52 percent. CQA 
1981 p . 348. Representative Jack Kemp found 63 percent military and 
military-related aid in the 1981 appropriations bill. CQA 1981 p. 346. 
But,  according to the present study's method of calculations the figure 
was 46 percent. CQA 1981 p . 350.
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by looking at the amendments to cut spending levels. Proposals to cut 
aid levels across-the-board appeared in the 95th House and the 96th 
Senate indexes. Proposals to cut military aid spending levels emerged 
in both Senate dimensions. Furthermore, the general nature of the 
funding issue can be seen by comparing the statistics for the 1979 mili­
tary aid authorization bill with those for that year's economic aid auth­
orization bill. For the years under study, this was the only time there 
were separate authorization b ills . In the Senate the loading for the mili­
tary aid vote was .701 and for economic aid it was .700. In the House 
the loadings were .63 and .74 respectively. The correlation coefficients 
for the two bills, however, were only .57 in the Senate and .58 in the 
H ouse.
Some elements of both hypothesized issue viewpoints, prodevelop­
ment and traditional, can be found within the four funding factors.
One obviously prodevelopment position is the approval of investing pub­
lic resources in efforts aimed at solving Third World problems. This 
support for aid, especially economic and multilateral, corresponds to 
this group 's view of an interdependent world. To a lesser extent this 
dimension includes aspects of the traditionalist perspective. For example, 
this viewpoint would include approval for the programs aimed at creat­
ing stable investment climates, as well as for programs which supported 
or rewarded American allies in the fight against communism.
The inverse of each side's view is also apparent within this dimen­
sion. Especially during the Carter administration the reasons tradition­
alists would have opposed funding included their dislike for wasteful 
spending on ineffective development programs and their frustration at 
not being able to control the economic and political directions of multi­
lateral aid. Prodevelopment disappointment in the funding bills, espe­
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cially during the Reagan administration, would have focused on military 
assistance to authoritarian governments unlikely to pursue progressive 
development policies.
The fact that the funding indexes include a combination of the two 
hypothesized viewpoints means that assigning traditional and prodevelop­
ment ends to these continuums would be presumptuous at best. How­
ever, this factor deserves attention because it explained more than 
36 percent of the variance for three out of four data sets. This impor­
tance corresponds to previous studies' findings that spending questions 
constitute an important dimension of congressional opinion on foreign 
aid. In the context of the present study, the relationship between 
funding and other policy decisions becomes more clear. The prominence 
o f funding issues may more than likely be evidence of the compromises 
between traditionalists and prodevelopment forces that have been nec­
essary in order to pass any overall funding m easures. In light of the 
six indexes remaining to be discussed, the funding factors will be con­
sidered as indicators of general foreign aid program approval or dis­
approval. The remaining indexes will be viewed as delineating the un­
derlying issue dimensions that are included within the funding factors.
Policy Questions
The second group of indexes are those constructed from the gen-
4eral and recipient factors. For all four data sets the research enabled 
the formation of one general index encompassing the divisions of opinion 
on major foreign aid policies. In addition, the 95th House and Senate 
were both assigned a recipient index which centers around more specific
4See table 4 for a synopsis of the issues included on each index. 
For a description of each vote, see table 1.
TABLE 4
SYNOPSES OF POLICY DIMENSION ISSUES
95th House General Dimension 
Only economic aid (7) .
Anti-communist restrictions (6).
Multilateral institutions (5).
Only military aid (2).
Aid to Panama (2) .
Aid to Nicaragua (2).
Cuts in bilateral aid spending levels (2) .
95th House Recipient Dimension
Aid to specific Central American 
nationas (5) .
Require loans to the private sector (1).
Aid to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (1).
Funds to the African Development Fund (1).
95th Senate General Dimension 
Multilateral institutions (6).
Only economic aid (5).
Ban aid to specific communist nations (4) .
95th Senate Recipient Dimension
Economic and/or military aid to different 
combinations of right-wing, moderate, or 
left-wing Central American nations (5).
96th House General Dimension
Military aid programs (2).
Caribbean Basin initiative (2) .
Require 50% of AID funds to be 
used for projects to help the 
poverty-stricken .
96th Senate General Dimension
Mostly military aid to right-wing 
governments and guerrilla 
groups (6) .
Only military aid (5) .
Nuclear proliferation restrictions 
( 2) .
Caribbean Basin Initiative (1).
Human rights in El Salvador (1) .
Food aid to Poland (1) .
Compensation for damages to U . S . 
Embassies (1).
Only economic aid (1) .
*The number in parentheses is the number of votes on the subject included in the index. The 
vote subtotals do not equal the total votes in each index because many votes were combinations of the 
issues outlined here. For a more complete vote by vote description, see table 1.
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policies towards certain Third World regions. The six policy question 
indexes appear to include enough of the hypothesized foreign aid posi­
tions to comfortably label the positive ends of each continuum prodevel­
opment and the negative ends traditionalist. This placement means that 
the coding for the 96th Congress is the reverse of the original coding 
scheme. The positive and negative placements for the two types of 
congressmen are not intended to imply more favorable attitudes towards 
a particular foreign aid policy by either the researcher or by the con­
gressmen.
95th House: General Index
The first factor in the 95th House centers around attempts to hold 
the line against restrictions to aid programs. The major focus of the 
restrictions is communism. Four of the bills deal with bans on aid to 
communist or left-leaning governments. A fifth vote seeks support for 
Taiwan, a traditional anti-communist United States ally, while a sixth 
vote prohibits school aid to leftist Nicaragua if Cubans are present on 
the school grounds. Four votes are on cuts in spending levels. Two 
of these concern overall funding levels; another is specifically leveled 
at the United Nations Development Fund; and the other is aimed at the 
World Bank. The remaining two votes in this index concern prohibiting 
economic and military assistance to Panama.
Because the negative side o f this dimension highlights anti­
communism, restrictions on economic and multilateral aid, and a pro- 
American attitude, it is probably a fair fit to the traditionalist approach 
described in the first hypothesis. There is, however, no actual re fer­
ence to this camp's supposedly favorable attitude towards helping to 
stablize investment climates. This is understandable because combating
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communism is believed to be necessary before private investments can 
be encouraged. The votes against aid to Panama can be interpreted as 
assigning a low priority to Third World nationalism. However, they also 
are indicative of a continuing negative response to the Panama Canal 
Treaties. Prodevelopment aspects include support for Third World 
independence over the narrower communist-versus-capitalist world view 
as well as their support for public investments in the economy. Within 
this index there are no clear lines drawn between the different types 
of aid. For example, there is prodevelopment support for both military 
and economic aid to Panama, military aid to Nicaragua, as well as sup­
port for general economic aid.
95th House: Recipient Index
Bills and amendments in the remaining 95th House factor aimed d if­
ferent types of economic and military aid at right-w ing or left-w ing 
governments in Southern Africa or Central America. This is probably 
closer to the hypothesized dimensions than the first index. Here sup­
port for the African Development Fund and military and economic aid to 
Nicaragua in particular and Central America in general are indicative 
of the prodevelopment dimension. Support for Central American aid was 
aimed at battling the Cubans and Soviets in the economic sphere. The 
new government of Nicaragua was not believed to be perfect, but it was 
considered to include a broad coalition of forces that had joined together 
to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship. If the United States was to have 
any positive influence on how the country was rebuilt, then it was im­
portant to cooperate with the new government and provide assistance. 
Congressmen with more traditionalist attitudes viewed Nicaraguan aid as 
help for a government already communist. The traditionalist end of this
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continuum is also indicated by support for requiring aid to Rhodesia if 
elections were held. They opposed President Carter's policy of waiting 
to give this country aid until after the Zimbabwe African National Union 
and the Zimbabwe African People's Union negotiated a settlement with 
the white-minority government. Also at the negative end of this index 
are votes to require support for private sector development in Nicar­
agua.
95th Senate: General Index
The general policy dimension for the 95th Senate is a condensed 
version of the first factor in the House. Four of the six votes are 
Senate rejections of the House bans on bilateral or multilateral aid to 
communist countries. The two other votes concern increasing appro­
priations for multilateral institutions over the House-passed amounts.
The positive side of this continuum indicates support for no-strings 
attached contributions to multilateral institutions. Bank supporters, 
believing that banks would not be able to accept money contributed with 
strings on it, viewed the restrictions as efforts to gut the banks. This 
is interpreted as a prodevelopment position because it places more em­
phasis on international cooperation involving economic problem s. The 
negative end of this continuum indicates a strong anti-communist attitude 
coupled with the belief that Congress must ensure that taxpayers money 
not be used to support America's supposed enemies. The bills in this 
dimension are all from a series of amendments concerning multilateral aid. 
Because the force behind the restrictions was anti-communism, this scale
will often be referred  to as an indication o f anti-communist sentiments.
53
95th Senate: Recipient Index
The other Senate factor for the end o f Carter's administration is 
similar to the House recipient index except that the Senate dimension 
concerns only Central American policies. Three of the five votes per­
tain to economic or military aid to Nicaragua and Central America. A 
fourth vote is on allowing the President to provide military aid to 
Nicaragua if the administration deemed that the Sandinista government 
was not violating human rights. The fifth vote is an attempt to cut aid 
to Nicaragua and redistribute most of the funds to the right-w ing gov­
ernment of El Salvador.
Even though this dimension concerns only Central American policy, 
it highlights well the disagreements about who should receive assistance. 
The positive end of the continuum represents support for strengthening 
Nicaraguan moderates with both economic and military aid. Not provid ­
ing aid to these forces was viewed as forcing the country to turn fu r­
ther to the Cubans and Soviets for more help. On the opposite end are 
those who cannot countanence Marxist participation in any government 
which receives American aid. As such, Nicaragua was considered to 
already be a communist controlled country. To support this belief, 
this camp cited the friendly ties Nicaragua had with Cuba and the fact 
that Nicaragua did not support the United States on such United Nations 
votes as the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The
traditionalist's anti-Sandinista opinion was so strong that it included
5
support for aid to guerrillas trying to overthrow that regime.
5CQA 1980, p . 325.
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96th House: General Index
For the most part the 96th House policy question dimension put 
guns and carrots on the negative end of the continuum and butter on 
the positive end. Decisions suggestive of the traditionalist perspective 
include support for funding construction of an airfield in Honduras, 
Military Assistance Grants to strategic, friendly governments and two 
votes in support of the CBI. This group 's positions on the CBI bills 
meant support for the program's trade provisions and opposition to 
imposing import quotas on duty-free rum. While it is obvious that the 
later bill was proposed in order to protect an American product, both 
bills probably indicate that some of the congressmen on the positive end 
o f this continuum either disagreed with the philosophy o f this type of 
aid or found that domestic concerns outweighed the intended benefits 
to the Caribbean. An indication of the type of aid more likely to be 
approved by prodevelopment representatives can be found in the posi­
tive loading for the requirement that at least 50 percent of the Agency 
for International Development (AID) bilateral assistance funds be used 
to finance projects that benefit those living in absolute poverty .
96th Senate: General Index
The policy question dimension for the 96th Senate appears to be a 
fairly good representation of the hypothesized issue dimensions. Most 
o f the issues involved have obviously traditionalist positions. The high­
est loading amendment on this factor was an effort to repeal the ban on 
military aid to the right-w ing dictatorship in Chile. Three other amend­
ments in which right-w ing elements in Central America received support 
dealt with providing covert aid to factions fighting the government of 
Nicaragua, funding construction o f an airfield in Honduras in order to
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build up the defenses of that country to withstand communist expansion, 
and opposing saddling the government of El Salvador with making human 
rights progress. The negative end of this continuum also includes e f­
forts to provide the President with a contingency fund within the 
Economic Support Fund (ESF).  The ESF is meant to aid economic de­
velopment in friendly countries so that they can spend more of their own 
resources on defense. The Reagan administration wanted the contin­
gency fund to help right-w ing governments, especially those in Central 
America. Similar beliefs are evident in votes to repeal the Clark amend­
ment which prohibited aid to anti-communist guerrillas fighting the 
leftist government of Angola.
Support for President Reagan's economic and military aid spending 
levels and the CBI also are in line with helping United States friends 
and, especially the later bill, encouraging private investment. The 
traditionalistic philosophy behind the CBI is not only evident because 
the program extended tax breaks to United States corporations investing 
in the region, but it is also evident in a long list of restrictions de­
signed to protect American sugar and textile p rodu cts, to prohibit aid 
to any nation not following the rules of free enterprise, and to exclude 
any nation not fully compensating Americans for nationalized property.
In this instance the traditionalist position on compensation matches the 
attitude towards this issue within Schneider's description of the conser­
vative belief system. However, the current study found evidence that 
this group 's demands for compensation might be outweighed by other 
concerns. This side mostly voted against an amendment which would 
have cut o ff aid to any country failing to fully compensate Americans 
for damages incurred in attacks on United States Embassies. The
56
amendment was proposed to cut o ff aid to Pakistan because that country 
was believed to be developing a nuclear weapon. The opposition on 
this vote, however, were more concerned with strengthening Pakistan's 
defenses in order to counter Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
The positive side of this continuum is of course the opposition to 
the above policies. For the most part the rationales have already been 
discussed. There are, however, three issues which deserve explanation. 
The first subject concerns support for cutting o ff aid to Pakistan and 
India if they explode a nuclear device. This prodevelopment position 
coincides with Schneider's descriptions of liberals being more concerned 
with new issues such as nuclear proliferation. Second, this side of 
the dimension supported cutting the CBI appropriation in half. The 
CBI did include some programs, such as offering poor countries better 
trade terms, which prodevelopment Senators might be expected to sup­
port. Their seemingly negative attitude is probably due to viewing the 
CBI as too little0 as well as the fact that the largest amount of money
was actually targeted at shoring up the right-w ing government of El
7Salvador in its battle against leftist guerrillas. Third, this side sup­
ported Food for Peace provisions to Poland as a means to support the 
efforts of Solidarity. This could be interpreted as a desire for the 
United States to support moderate elements within the communist world. 
But,  since it was also a highly partisan issue it could be indicative of 
general dislike of the administration's conduct o f foreign policy.
In summary, the indexes in this study have found support for very
0
Almost all of the products on this bill's duty-free list already had 
that status. CQA 1982, p . 152.
?CQA 1982, p. 154.
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different types of aid, aimed at different types of recipients, and in­
tended to accomplish different types of purposes. They are not nice, 
neat replications of the hypotheses, but then conclusions without quali­
fy ing exceptions are seldom the case in social science research. Satis­
faction can be found in the fact that all ten indexes seem to include 
all aspects of the hypothesized issue positions. More important is the 
appearance of prodevelopment and traditional viewpoints on the expected 
ends of the six policy question continuums. What this section has done, 
therefore, is to provide a foundation to discuss how congressional fo r ­
eign aid views might be affected by party, constituency and personal 
characteristics.
Effects of Independent Variables
It was hypothesized that supporters of the two foreign aid dimen­
sions would come from two slightly different groups of congressmen. 
Traditionalists were thought to more likely be conservatives, non-N orth- 
eastern Republicans, members from Mountain states, Southerners, and 
members from lower income areas. Prodevelopment support was hypo-
g
thesized to come from liberals, Democrats, Easterners, high income 
constituencies and urban areas. In order to ascertain the effects of 
these two groups of variables, each set of factors were included in 
separate regression analyses of the ten indexes. A comparison of the 
accuracy of these two equations can be found in table 5 which shows 
the R square for each equation on each index. The R square gives the 
researcher an indication of how much of the variance in the dependent 
variable is explained by a set of independent variables. For each index
g
Northeast and Middle Atlantic states.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF R2 FROM THREE EQUATIONS
Traditional Prodevelopment Non-selective
2 ** R (F ) 2 ** R (F )
Funding Dimmensions
2 ** 
R (F )
95th House .603 (128.917) .613 (134.509) .622 (62.720)
95th Senate .320 (8.742) .292 (7.662) .331 (3.910)
96th House .306 (37.378) .318 (39.621) .341 (19.672)
96th Senate .430 (14.005) .514 (19.667) .559 (10.006)
Policy Question Dimmensions 
95th House
General .756 (262.768) 
Recipient .809 (360.398)
.767 (279.491) 
.807 (354.598)
.772 (128.795) 
.809 (161.123)
95th Senate 
General .483 (17.402)
Recipient .427 (13.869)
.471 (16.558)
.423 (13.661)
.508 (8.179)
.440 (6.209)
96th House
General .642 (151.865) .642 (152.252) .650 (70.502)
96th Senate
General .840 (97.583) .891 (152.785) .904 (74.320)
** All F values are significant at the .01 confidence level.
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the two sets of variables explain almost the same amount of variance.
The only times that the R squares differ by more than .05 are for the 
two 96th Senate indexes. These slight departures could possibly be 
due to the fact that these dimensions are the ones on which the pro­
development equation's odd variable, metropolitan characteristics, has 
its most significant effects.
In order to ascertain whether there are any noticeable advantages 
to choosing specific categories of party and region, each index was 
analyzed by a third regression equation which included the influences 
o f all categories of these two variables. The regional groups were 
Northeast, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, 
Mountain, Pacific, B order, and South. The non-selective equation 
explains either the same amount of variance or slightly more than the 
hypothesized set o f factors (see table 5 ). Any increase in the accur­
acy o f this third set of variables, however, comes at the expense of 
a great deal of significance. Although all the F values on the third 
equation are still significant at the .01 level, they drop to about half 
the F values produced by the hypotheses' equations.
Within each data set, all three equations are better indicators of 
positions on the six policy indexes than they are of opinions on the four 
funding indexes. This is as expected because the funding dimensions 
are assumed to incorporate the compromises necessary to approve over­
all foreign aid p o licy . As general dimensions, the funding indexes 
should blurr the divisions of opinion. Because of this, as well as be­
cause this study is mainly focused on analyzing the more specific issue 
areas, the funding indexes will be discussed briefly and the policy 
question indexes will receive a more in depth analysis.
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Funding Decisions
Because the four funding continuums are assumed not to have pro­
development and traditional ends, they will be discussed in terms of 
who opposed and supported the aid programs. Divisions of opinion 
were found by running regressions on each index with the two equations 
containing hypothesized variables. If these equations are representative 
of foreign aid coalitions, then it is hoped that the analysis in this sec­
tion might infer which senators and representatives are more or less 
supportive of overall foreign aid programs.
In order to gain some insight into the relative strength of each
variable within each equation, standardized beta coefficients will be com- 
9
pared. A look at table 6 shows that bivariate betas, except those 
for  party and the South, are always significant at the .05 level and are 
at least above .11. The real fun begins, however, when controls are 
introduced with the multiple regressions. (See table 7 .)
Ideology appears to have the greatest significant effect on the 
funding dimensions. Liberals are more favorable while conservatives 
are more critical. Bivariate betas show that ideological influences are 
more distinct during the 95th Congress than they are for the 96th. 
However, when controls are added, the effect of ideology remains the 
same in the 95th, but it grows considerably for the 96th. Apparently, 
the dynamics o f the later Congress were such that the interrelationships 
among the variables served to uncover more ideological d ifferences.
9
Two types of standardized beta coefficients will be used. Bivari­
ate betas indicate the effects a single independent variable such as 
ideology has on a dependent variable such as a funding index. Partial 
betas indicate the effects an independent variable has after the effects 
o f the other independent variables have been controlled.
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BIVARIATE BETAS ON FUNDING DIMENSIONS
TABLE 6
Variables in Traditionalist Equation
House Senate
95th 96th 95th 96th
I- ** ■>V ri”Ideology .76““ .43““ .51 .3 5
Non-Northeastern
Republicans -.46““ -.08 -.18 .05
......
Mountain -.12“ -.ll“ -.3l““ -.20“
VwVSouth -.30 -.25““ -.18 -.27
......
Income .37“" .34““ .29““ -50““
Variables in Prodevelopment Equation
House Senate
95th 96th 95th 96th
Ideology .76““ .43“' .5 1““ .35““
Democrats .42““ .05 .17 -.13
East
__»—»-
.31 .27““ *.22 .38““
Income .3 7““ .3 4“'
J U L
.29““ .50““
Metro /V-/V VwV.40 .35 *.25 **.38
Significant at .05 confidence level.
Significant at .01 confidence level.
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PARTIAL BETAS ON FUNDING DIMENSIONS
TABLE 7
Traditionalist Equation
House Senate
95th 96th 95th 96th
Ideology
_*-
.66"“ .66“'
J_«-
.52““ .59“
Non-Northeastern 
Republicans -.06 .36“" . 18
J . .
.50“
Mountain -.04 -.06
J ) .J .
-.20 -.15“
South -.02 -.09“ .02 .05
Income ✓ w\. 18 .19““ .11 7 ".37
Prodevelopment Equation
House Senate
9 5 t h 9 6 t h 9 5 t h 9 6 t h
I d e o l o g y
VwV
.65
t\ A
.57 . 5 3 “ “
JLJLi
. 6 9 “
D e m o c r a t s .04 - . 3 3 “ “ - . 1 3 -. 66
E a s t
■J-JU
. 1 0 “ “ .06 .05 .06
I n c o m e . 1 2 “ “ .08 .02 . 1 7 “ “
M e t r o
* *
.07 . 1 4 “ “ .11
* *
.20
Significant at .05 confidence level.
Significant at .01 confidence level.
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There is not a great deal o f difference between ideology's effect on the 
two House indexes, except that the less-selective prodevelopment equa­
tion does assign a somewhat lesser role to ideological influences in the 
later time period. More information is available from an examination of 
the two Senate indexes. Ideology is the only consistently significant 
influence in the 95th Senate. Its effect is larger in the next Senate, 
but so are the effects from most of the other variables. It appears that 
in 1981-82 ideological, party, socioeconomic, and urban-rural lines 
were drawn much more sharply with liberals, Republicans, higher in­
come states and urban areas providing the most support to foreign aid 
funding.
By themselves party positions are clear only for the 95th House. 
Democrats supported foreign aid and non-Northeastern Republicans 
opposed it. However, after controlling the effects of the other vari­
ables, the effect of party is seen to be much different. While party 
positions are not distinguishable for the 95th Congress, the non-North- 
eastern Republicans become significantly favorable towards aid spending 
in 1981-1982. This may indicate that the changing focus of aid, away 
from anti-poverty programs and towards a more militaristic posture, 
helped pull more than the usual number of Republicans towards support 
while it drove more than the usual number o f Democrats into opposition . 
The Republican position may also have been due to loyalty to their par­
ty 's  president. This greater partisan split during a Republican admini­
stration does not coincide with Turner's and Clausen's finding that 
Republican presidents receive more bipartisan support for foreign policy. 
However, it is probably safe to suggest that the previous Republican 
administrations of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford did not change the
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scope of policy as much as Reagan.
None of the above discussion of party influences is meant to imply 
that President Carter enjoyed bipartisan support for his foreign aid 
policies. In fact, during 1979 to 1980 his administration was unable to 
secure final passage of a separate appropriations bill.
The regional variables, Mountain and Southern in the traditional 
equation and Eastern in the prodevelopment equation, provide only a 
few minor instances of significant effects that lend themselves to inter­
pretations . Mountain senators were more opposed to aid than were the 
region 's representatives. This finding may be clouded by the fact that 
the percentage of senators from Mountain states is much higher than 
the proportion of House members from the region. Analyses without 
controls show Mountain representatives very slightly in the opposition 
camp. Southerners normally were not strongly either way on funding 
bills. They were somewhat supportive in the 96th House when funding 
bills were more traditionalistic. This position did not carry over signi­
ficantly to their counterparts in the Senate.
Bivariate betas show Easterners significantly supportive of funding 
foreign aid. However, three times out of four this importance dis­
appears when controls are added. It may be reasoned that ideology, 
income level and urban characteristics serve to explain most Eastern 
su pport.
Second to ideology, appears to be constituency income levels with 
members from higher income areas supportive and those from lower income 
areas opposed. All bivariate betas infer a significant influence for 
this variable. In fact, among all bivariate betas on funding and poli­
cy  question scales, the only time that the ideology ones are not the
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largest comes in the 96th Senate funding dimension in which income is 
the largest. Some of this influence, however, is subsequently explained 
by the other variables. This effect of income remains strongest in the 
95th House and for the 96th Senate. In the 96th House it is significant 
with the traditional equation, but not with the prodevelopment set of 
variables. This is probably partly due to the inclusion of metropolitan 
characteristics in the later equation.
Urban senators and representatives are somewhat more supportive 
o f foreign aid funding than are their colleagues from rural areas. The 
significance of this influence survives controls on both indexes in the 
House and on the 96th Senate index, but the partial betas are of a 
rather low magnitude. Metropolitan characteristics are strongest when 
party is also strong. This indicates that party differences that cannot 
be explained as ideological or due to income levels are related to whether 
or not members represent urban or rural states.
In order to test whether or not the selective party and region 
variables offer valid descriptions of regional and partisan influences, 
multiple regressions including all categories of these variables were done 
on each funding index (see table 8 ). The only finding worthy of men­
tion concerns the 96th Senate. This is the dimension on which income 
and metropolitan variables make their highest marks. However, caution 
is in order because the results in table 8 suggest that more inclusive 
regional and party categories tend to dilute the strength of income and 
metropolitan effects.
In summary, the differences in the policies included within the 95th 
Congress funding measures as opposed to those of the 96th Congress 
appear to have been great enough to change the make-up of coalitions
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RESULTS OF NON-SELECTIVE REGRESSIONS ON THE 
96TH SENATE FUNDING DIMENSION
TABLE 8
Partial Beta R 2 C hange 2r B ivariate  Beta
Id eo log y
**
.69 .12 .12
**
.35
P arty
**
- .6 9 .16 .02 - .1 3
R egion a .05 .34 a
Incom e .14 .01 .25
**
.50
M etro
**
.17 .02 .15
**
.38
Multiple R . 747 
R2 .559
F 10.006
Significant at the .01 confidence level.
Multiple regression does not offer a partial beta for dichotomous 
variables with more than two categories.
supporting and opposing overall aid spending levels. The most obvious 
movement towards a realignment was the increase in Republican support 
and Democratic opposition to funding foreign aid when the scope o f the 
programs shifted towards a more traditionalist approach. The following 
discussion of the influences affecting issues, which are more specifically 
policy-related, offers a better indication of who supports what.
Policy Question Indexes
An examination o f the standardized beta coefficients for the six 
policy question indexes shows that in every analysis one variable, ide­
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ology , had by far the strongest effect on congressional voting. (See 
tables 9 and 10 .) On four indexes the party variables, non-Northeast- 
ern Republicans in the traditional equation and Democrats in the pro­
development equation, are a distant second in strength. The region 
variables, Mountain and Southern in traditional and Eastern in prodevel­
opment, were similar in that they produced very few significant effects. 
Both equations assigned small, but significant, betas to income level in­
fluences for two indexes. Urban-rural differences did not add much to 
the explanation of voting positions when it was included on the prode­
velopment regressions. Only once, when the Senate divided over anti­
communist attitudes, did metropolitan characteristics become important.
There was some diversity in the results attributable to the d iffer­
ent variables included in the two equations. However, most of the 
identifiable differences, appeared between the House and the Senate or 
among the indexes. In order to clarify the relative importance of each 
variable, the ensuing discussion will focus on each independent variable 
as it affects the positions on the policy indexes.
Ideology
The most glaring result of the regression analyses is that ideology 
consistently exhibits the greatest effect on congressional foreign aid 
voting. The ideology betas are the only ones which are significant at 
the .01 level on every index. The positive betas for ideology indicate 
that liberals are more likely at the prodevelopment ends of the continuums 
while the conservatives are more likely at the traditionalist en d s.
Eleven times out of twelve, ideology is stronger in the House than 
in the Senate. The only exception occurs when the traditionalist equa­
tion assigns an extraordinarly high partial beta to ideology in the 96th
TABLE 9
BIVARIATE BETAS ON POLICY QUESTION DIMENSIONS
Variables in Traditionalist Equation
95th louse 96th House 95th Senate 96th Senate
Recipient General General Recipient General General
Ideology .  8 6 ** .87""
__U
.77““ .65"" 7 w \.59 .88"“
Non-northeastern JUJU J U U JUJU J __u
Republicans -.74''" -.53“" -.66"" -,40“" -.12 -.79""
Mountain - .  10" -.08 -.03 -.23" -.24“ -.14
— U ** ■;V -U A .South -.16"" -.26“" -.22 -.24 -.36“" -.17
.»__JU JUJU ..u j u
Income .  14" “ .26"" .02 .27"" .47"" .13
Variables in Prodevelopment Equation
95th Souse 96th House 95th Senate 96th Senate
Recipient General General Recipient General General
JUJU __U JUJU JU .U -»— U JUJU
Ideology .86"" .87"“ . 77" ' .65"" .59"" .88"“
J»-JU ** JUJU _»__uDemocrats .73"" .5 3"" .64 .35"" .17 .8 7""
_»__u JU V w VEast .16"" .12" .13 .18 .18 .19
__u V w V JUJU
A A
Income .14"" .26 .02 .27"“ .47"" .13
J U L „UJU JUJU A *UJU JU
Metro .  30" .35"" .  16"' .20 .  40 .2 4"
05oo
Significant at .05 confidence level.
J U U
Significant at .01 confidence level.
TABLE 10
PARTIAL BETAS ON POLICY QUESTION DIMENSIONS
Traditionalist Equation
95th ]House 96th House 95th Senate 96th Senate
Recipient General General Recipient General General
JUJU JUJU .»_U JUJU JUJU
Ideology . 67" .89"" .63"" .57"" .6 0"" .7 1"“
Non-northeastern 
Republicans - .32 .02
JUJU
-.22“" -.05
-U~U
.26""A
JUa»U
-.3 0""_u
Mountain -.00 .02 .04 -.06 -.14" .08""
South .04 .05" -.06" -.06 -.04 .01
Income .00 .03
JUJU
-.10“" .03
»UJU
.2 3"" -.07
95th :
Prodevelopment Equat 
House 96th House
ion
95th Senate 96th Senate
Recipient General General Recipient General General
JUJU J U L JUJU *uju _U -»—u
Ideology . 67 .88“" .7 0"“ . 64 .60"" .56""
Democrats **.32 .00 .18"" -.01
J U t
-.19""
.uu
.4 7""
East -.01
J --- U
-.12""
-U
-.0 5" .00 -.08 -.02
Income -.03 .02
JU
-.0 7" .02
.UJU
.18"" -.00
Metro .03 .03 -.04 .03 . 19"" -.00
Significant at .05 confidence level.
JUJU
Significant at .01 confidence level.
70
Senate. The traditionalist regression shows a .71 partial beta while 
the prodevelopment one produces a .56 partial beta. This is one of the 
largest differences between the partial betas for comparable variables.
An analysis of the influences o f the other factors in both equations on 
this index shows that the Democrats are a stronger control variable 
than are the non-Northeastern Republicans. It should be noted that 
the Democrat variable measures the strength of both parties. As such 
it could mean that the overall effect of party on this dimension is dilut­
ed by the inclusion of the more selective, non-Northeastern Republican 
variable on the traditionalist equations. Therefore, the results probably 
make it safe to say that on all indexes, ideology is more of a factor in 
the House than in the Senate.
The strongest presence of ideology is on the general index in the 
95th House. At first glance there is no ready explanation why this index 
produces an ideology partial beta so exceptionally large. Another look 
at the House dimensions, shows that this one includes the broadest 
range of bills. However, on the 96th Senate dimension, which is the 
broadest Senate index, ideology is not noticeably higher than on any 
other Senate index. One explanation for this discrepency between ide­
ology 's affect on these two broad indexes may be that ideological d iffer­
ences are stronger in the House. An alternative explanation is based 
on analysis o f the indexes on which the ideology bivariate betas are in 
the .86 to .88 range. Of these indexes the 95th House general index 
shows by far the lowest influence from the uncontrolled party variables. 
Furthermore, this index's counterpart, the general 95th Senate index, 
also shows insignificant party influence when other variables are not 
controlled. The party variables only become important after controls
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are added. They do not, however, detract from the importance of 
ideology. Therefore, it may be that under the Carter administration, 
ideology played a greater role in development opinions because party 
influences were fuzzier.
Party
All twelve bivariate regressions show non-Northeastern Republicans 
to be more traditionalist and Democrats more prodevelopmental. The 
major finding, however, concerning the effects of the two party variables 
is that they tend to be factors which become important if ideology is 
showing less than its usual dominance. In three of the four multiple 
regressions producing significant party influence, the members follow 
expected patterns. Several enlightening exceptions will be discussed 
within the context of comparing House and Senate counterpart indexes 
and comparing the 95th Congress with the 96th.
Analyzing the general indexes in the 95th Congress shows that 
party produced different results in the House than in the Senate. In 
the House party is significant by itself, but with multivariate regressions 
its importance is subsequently explained as ideological differences. In 
many respects the situation surrounding the 95th Senate is general 
index is different. This dimension is the only time the party variables 
are not significant by themselves. When the other variables are controlled, 
party influences remain significant, but alas party positions are reversed. 
The most likely interpretation of this deviation is that while the House 
scale is one of the broadest definitions of traditional versus prodevelop­
ment positions, the Senate index may actually be a more clear measure 
o f anti-communist sentiment. This sentiment is probably somewhat 
distinct from the other aspects of the prodevelopment and traditionalist
72
dimensions. As such when it comes to communism, the difference be­
tween the parties is not as significant as ideology, income or urban-rural 
constituencies. Conservatives and senators from lower income or rural 
states tend to take a more active anti-communist stance.
There are also differences between the results for the 95th Congress 
indexes surrounding the ideological make-up of aid recipients. The par­
tisan split is greater on this House dimension than it is on any other 
House dimension. Democrats supported American aid to more progressive 
countries while non-Northeastern Republicans supported aid to elements 
more likely to maintain the status quo. That this is the most partisan 
dimension is not surprising. The policies incorporated into this dimen­
sion concern President Carter's positions towards Central America and 
Southern Africa. The partisan nature of this index may indicate the 
pull of presidential loyalty as well as party position.
The Senate's counterpart index concerning recipient's ideology is 
related to the right and left only in Central America. It indicates that 
alternative forces were present during this body 's consideration of 
Carter's policies. While party members follow their expected positions 
when party influences are analyzed separately, party positions become 
insignificant when controls are added. Because this dimension has the 
lowest R square of any of the policy question dimensions (see table 
5 ), it might indicate that, more than for any other index, the divisions 
o f opinion are due to independent variables other than the ones included 
here. In fact, the only variable in this study which is significant on 
this dimension is ideology .
A comparison of party influence on the general indexes in the 95th 
Congress to the indexes in the 96th Congress shows that party solidar-
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TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF PARTY SUPPORT FOR PRODEVELOPMENT, 
MODERATE, AND TRADITIONAL POSITIONS 
95TH AND 96TH SENATE GENERAL DIMENSIONS
Democrats Republicans
95th 96th 95th 96th
Prodevelopment
% (#) % (#) % (#) % (# )
(1 .00 to 0.34) 55 (33) 70 (33) 41 (17) 0 (0 )
Moderate
(0.33 to -0 .33 ) 8 (5 ) 26 (12) 5 (2 ) 13 (7 )
Traditional
(-0 .3 4  to -1 .00 ) 37 (22) 4 (2 ) 54 (22) 87 (47)
Totals 100 (60) 100 (47) 100 (41) 100 (54)
ity might have been greater during the later Congress. In the House 
the increase in party effects may be attributable to a decrease in ideo­
logical differences. It may also be an indication that the 32 additional 
Republicans in the 96th House helped make party divisions more pro­
nounced.
In the Senate there is no noticeable difference in the effect of 
ideology, whereas party appears to have made a gigantic jump in impor­
tance. In 1981 and 1982 the Republicans were the Senate majority. Also 
during this time President Reagan was asking Congress to approve 
changes in the direction of foreign aid. A look at table 11 shows that 
the percentage o f prodevelopment Republicans dropped from 41 percent 
in the 95th Senate to none in the 96th, while traditional Democrats de­
creased from 37 percent to 4 percent. Much of this polarization shows 
that the parties had obviously different reactions to the President's 
proposed policy changes in foreign aid.
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Region
Contrary to the findings of most previous research, the results of 
this study's regression analysis find region to be either slightly impor­
tant or not significant. Much of this seemingly unimportant status for 
region might be explained as attributable to the inclusion of an ideology 
variable and left at that. However, the equation only included selective 
categories, Mountain and Southern in the traditional equation and Eastern 
in the prodevelopment. Because the use of selective categorical vari­
ables in multiple regressions may not be the best method of ascertaining 
their overall e ffects , it is felt that a more in depth analysis of region 
is in order.
An analysis of variance performed on the policy question dimensions 
shows Southern, Mountain, and West North Central states to be consis­
tently more traditional than their colleagues in both the House and Senate 
(see table 12). In the House, Northeastern and Pacific representatives 
provides the most consistent prodevelopment support. Meanwhile, p ro­
development sentiment in the Senate usually came from the Middle Atlantic, 
East North Central and Northeast regions. Pacific coast senators 
changed from a prodevelopment position in the 95th Congress to a tradi­
tionalist view in the 96th. This reversal can partially be explained by 
the election in 1980 of more Republicans from this region.
When adjustments are made for party, several large gaps between 
party position within regions are uncovered in the House. The strong­
est intra-region disagreement appears to be between Republicans and 
Democrats from the Upper Midwest. Much of this is due to West North 
Central Democrats being some of the most consistently strong prodevel­
opment supporters. Within the Mountain and Border regions, party
TABLE 12
REGIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM THE GRAND MEAN FOR POLICY DIMENSIONS
House
95 th 95 th 96th ** 95th ** 9 5th ** 96th *•Recipient General General Recipient General General
Northeast .28 .45 .45 .36 .21 .39
Middle Atlantic . 12 .15 .06 .16 .13 .09
East North Central .15 -.01 .03 .10 .23 .09
West North Central -.13 -.08 -.03 .20 .08 .15
Mountain -.27 -.36 -.11 -.17 -.13 .06
Pacific .34 . 15 .12 .12 .32 .11
Border -.12 -.00 . 12 -.14 -.22 .01
South -.35 -.22 -.27 -.33 -.43 -.36
Grand Mean .12 -.26 -.17
Senate
Adjusted Deviations Deviation Adjusted for Party
95 th ,_v 9 5 th _._v 96th 95th ** 95th * 96th**Recipient General General Recipient General General
Northeast .35 .20 .29 .34 .20 .24
Middle Atlantic .15 .40 .26 .20 .42 .29
East North Central .41 .56 .26 .30 .51 .09
West North Central -.03 -.22 -.25 .07 -.18 .02
Mountain -.39 -.46 -.24 -.27 -.40 -.05
Pacific .39 .66 -.11 .39 .66 -.03
Border .00 .31 .37 -.03 .29 . 12
South -.36 -.59 -.25 -.44 -.63 -.36
Grand Mean .13 .04 -.17
*Significant
JUJU
.02 confidence level. Significant .01 confidence level.
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account for the g a p .
In the Senate, adjustments for party produces different results. 
There is no consistently large change in regional deviations from the 
grand mean. Curiously though, during the 95th Senate, several reg ­
ional groups of Republicans are more prodevelopment than are their 
Democratic colleagues. For 1979 to 1980 East North Central and Border 
Democrats are more traditional than Republicans. On the general index, 
Senate Democrats from the East North Central, West North Central, 
Border and Pacific states seem to have taken stands slightly the reverse 
of their hypothesized positions. Again this index measures anti-commun­
ist sentiment and thus these results are confirmation of the theory that 
anti-communist attitudes are not clearly based on party.
Income
When considered by itself income turns out to be a significant fac­
tor on all four indexes in the 95th Congress, but it is not significant 
in either index in the 96th Congress. When significant, higher income 
levels tend to imply prodevelopment positions. When controls are em­
ployed, however, the importance of income disappears three times out of 
four. This may mean that the influence of income is usually explainable 
in terms of the other variables. The only time income remains signifi­
cant is on the 95th Senate index concerning anti-communist attitudes.
The odd finding concerning income appears on the 96th House index 
on which this variable is significant only after the other influences are 
controUed. This time low income districts tend to produce prodevelop­
ment positions. However, a check on the R square change for this in­
dex shows that including income in the equations explains less than one 
percent more variance. Therefore, not much wiU be made o f this appar-
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ment positions. However, a check on the R square change for this in­
dex shows that including income in the equations explains less than one 
percent more variance. Therefore, not much will be made of this appar­
ent discrepency except to say that income is probably not a very good 
indicator of opinions on foreign aid policy questions.
Metro
The only time metropolitan characteristics produced a significant 
partial beta is on the 95th Senate's general index. Again, since this 
index also overtly measures anti-communist attitudes, it may be that 
senators from more rural states are more likely to favor restrictions 
on aid if it might go to communist countries. Considered alone this 
factor does produce betas significantly tilted toward urban support for 
the prodevelopment position. This tendency is more pronounced in the 
House than in the Senate. This would seem natural because congres­
sional districts are more homogeneous than are states.
Comparing the results for funding indexes to policy question in­
dexes proves to be mostly an exercise riddled with confusing exceptions. 
Thus, most interpretations would be weak at best. There are, of course, 
three exceptions where generalizations may be made. The first is that 
liberals support spending and a prodevelopment perspective, and conser­
vatives are more reluctant to fund programs and they are more tradi­
tionalist. The second generalization concerns the effects of constituents' 
income levels and the percentage of urban residents. Higher income 
and more urban areas tend to be indicators of funding support while 
they are not important criteria for differentiating policy positions. The 
second tentative finding concerns the clarification o f party positions in 
the 96th Congress. The stronger party effects found for the funding
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indexes correspond to a wider partisan split on the policy question 
sca les. A more in depth analysis of conclusions will be undertaken in
the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The first hypothesis was that this research would find two foreign 
aid issue dimensions, one incorporating traditionalist views and the other 
prodevelopment beliefs. Instead, the factor analysis produced dimen­
sions for funding, general policy and specific policy. Each factor in­
cluded aspects of prodevelopment and traditionalist p erspectives.
Semantics aside, it may have been too much to hope that factor analyses 
of four data sets would produce for each set only two dimensions, one 
traditional and the other prodevelopment, or even one single dimension 
with prodevelopment and traditional ends. Nevertheless, the results 
are actually fairly remarkable in their consistency across data sets. 
Funding and general policy indexes appeared for each group. Both 
chambers of the 95th Congress had a third factor centered around who 
should receive United States aid, the issue hypothesized to be the major 
point of disagreement between the two sides. Furthermore, there were 
no major differences between the focus of issues considered by the House 
and Senate. The hypothesized issue viewpoints were easily assigned to 
the poles o f all six policy dimensions, thus providing the foundation to 
test the remaining hypotheses concerning who is traditional and who 
prodevelopm ent.
The appearance o f funding dimensions does not imply rejection of a 
policy oriented view of foreign aid issues. These dimensions o ffer a
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base to study support and opposition to overall policy. The policy 
question factors serve as indicators of the broad range of foreign aid 
issues. In this study two of the general indexes, the 95th House and 
the 96th Senate, were close to the hoped for general measurements.
Both o f these factors explained a majority of the variance. A third 
general index, the 96th House policy dimension, was an important second 
o f two factors. Only for the 95th Senate did the general index factor 
explain a relatively small portion of the variance. While any conclusions 
about a two-sided division over foreign aid is still rather speculative, 
the symmetry among the measures used here for issue dimensions have 
substantially reduced the complexity of the foreign aid issues.
The perspectives of United States foreign aid have been divided 
into two simplified positions. For the most part they correspond well 
to the findings of Schneider and to the liberal-conservative definitions 
offered  by McCormick and Black. On one side of the policy dimensions 
this study found all of the hypothesized traditionalist rationales about 
aid policies. Seeing the world through Cold War lenses, this group is 
mostly concerned with fostering private enterprise and using force to 
protect the status quo and American interests. Foreign aid is useful 
if it enables the United States to make a strong response to the spread 
o f communism. During the 95th Congress they were more or less in the 
position of restricting the growth of economic aid programs believed to 
be wasteful and aimed at impossible goa ls. The relevance they attached 
to military aid as opposed to economic aid is more clear for the 96th 
Congress than for the 95th. For 1981-1982 they supported limited trade 
and investment incentives as proper economic aid. This is more in line 
with classical economic views that any government involvement in the
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economy should be limited. Whatever development that occurs will hap­
pen through private inititiatives and concerns about equity and social 
change are better left alone. The substantial support that this group 
gave to military aid may be an indication o f the willingness to use force 
to create conditions where private enterprise might be safe.
This analysis also substantiated the hypothesis that the prodevelop­
ment position centered around a broader view of world issu es. This 
group is apparently more likely to place greater emphasis on internation­
al cooperation and is less likely to interpret the Third World's nation­
alistic activities as direct threats to American interests. As far as the 
development-military aid dichotomy is concerned the results show a 
mixture nearly opposite the traditionalist position. In the 95th Congress 
prodevelopment forces supported a larger role for economic assistance. 
Meanwhile, they did not oppose military aid especially if it was targeted 
at moderate or left-leaning governments. In the 96th Congress this side 
maintained their support for development programs but opposed the in­
creases and intended uses of military aid desired by the traditionalist 
Reagan administration. This may mean that while prodevelopment con­
gressmen accept the importance of military concerns they qualify their 
support according to their opinion of the uses and targets of military 
aid. On the whole, they believe that more attention needs to be on the 
problems that make countries susceptable to communist advances. The 
problems are to be addressed by spending public funds on anti-poverty 
program s.
It appears that when congressmen are faced with choosing the de­
sired focus of foreign aid, they most often make decisions based on 
their preconceived notions about the ideological leanings of the intended
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recipient governm ents. Traditionalists support governments more to the 
right side o f the political spectrum while prodevelopment congressmen 
support those more to the left. This does not imply that the American 
legislators approve all the policies of their favored countries. It does 
indicate what type of countries each group trusts to more likely carry 
out their foreign aid philosophies.
The second and third hypotheses concerned the coalitions of sup­
port for  the two foreign aid concepts. Substantiation o f these expecta­
tions becomes rather complex because the results of the factor analyses 
produced several types of dimensions. Not much information is forth ­
coming from a comparison o f the effects on the funding and policy ques­
tion in dexes. The only finding is that liberals were more likely sup­
portive of funding and the prodevelopment positions while conservatives 
more often opposed funding and supported the traditionalist position.
On funding indexes party positions were not conclusive for the 95th 
Congress, but in the 96th Congress Republicans were more supportive 
and Democrats more opposed. This indicates that party positions prob­
ably depend on the general focus of the aid programs as well as the 
party in the White House. Unlike previous studies, this one found 
greater partisan differences under a Republican President. This indi­
cates the hazards that changing political circumstances mean for making 
any longitudinal conclusions. The results concerning region, income and 
urban-rural factors do not permit conclusions. The lack of regional 
influences on funding questions differs from most other studies, but 
the unimportance o f all three demographic characteristics confirms 
Demack's conclusions.
Probably the major finding of this project was that ideology has a
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very  significant effect on the policy positions of congressmen. This is 
evidence that the set of beliefs members of Congress bring with them 
are important influences on the decision-making process. The ideology 
variable was intended to measure attitudes on both domestic and foreign 
policy views. Its apparent importance may help confirm the idea that 
Congress looks at foreign aid from the same set of beliefs as they do 
domestic issues. Speculating on this conclusion a bit further, the 
supposedly different nature of the foreign aid issue due to its lack of 
domestic clientele does not seem to mean that congressmen make decisions 
about it from a different set o f beliefs.
Other effects on policy issues did not offer consistent substantia­
tion of the hypotheses. Party positions were as expected only half 
the time. Non-Northeastern Republicans were more likely traditional and 
Democrats more prodevelopment. Their significance was much less when 
ideology rose in importance. Overall ideology was a much better indica­
tor of opinion. This finding adds some weight to the idea that parties 
are decreasing in influence. Party cohesion is, however, affected by 
the inducement of presidential loyalty. Democrats supported President 
Carter's specific policies but the support for his plans was somewhat 
different than for the more general issues during his administration.
On the other side, Republicans responded favorably to President 
Reagan's policy positions.
As far as regional differences are concerned, the results are cause 
for speculation, but not conclusion. It appears that Mountain and 
Southern members, along with their colleagues from the West North 
Central states, tended to be traditional. While Northeasterners were 
always more likely prodevelopment, other support for this view more
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often than not came from Middle Atlantic, East North Central and 
Pacific regions. Income and urban-rural variables usually offered in­
significant or inconclusive effects. However, it appears that there is 
an interaction among all the hypothesized influences that this study is 
not designed to uncover. Especially the effects of region appear to be 
explainable by a combination of ideological, partisan, income and metro­
politan characteristics. Further research using path analysis may be 
able to shed more light on the dynamics of foreign aid policy-m aking. 
Another suggestion for future research would be a more longitudinal 
analysis in order to improve the chances of identifying changes in 
policy dimensions as well as providing a better base to ascertain the 
effects of d iffering political influences. Other research may also be 
able to offer simpler equations to ascertain how divisions over foreign 
aid are influenced by other political forces . In the present study, the 
use o f two similar equations to measure the effects of influences on 
congressional opinions was necessary to maintain the consistency of the 
research effort. However, it added more to the complexity of the pro­
ject than it aided the findings.
As the world becomes more interdependent American isolationist 
tendencies become less possible. Congressional positions towards foreign 
aid show that there are identifiable opinions on how the United States 
ought to involve itself in foreign affairs. These attitudes are based 
upon different world-views leading senators and representatives to make 
different conclusions about what problem -solving techniques the United 
States should use to protect its interests. What choices are made have 
important ramifications for the course of world events. How these de­
cisions are made has become important not only to Americans but also
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to the rest of the world.
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